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Trade-offs? The US and the Caribbean
by Bob Graham

taken a potentially positive decision to begin
negotiations on a freetrade pact. Nonetheless,
this decision poses challenges for a region of great importance to the US: the Caribbean
Basin.
A US-Mexico trade pact must
not damage--even inadvertentlyUS trade ties with the fragile economies of the Caribbean Basin's
emerging democracies. The US
must also be sensitive to the implications of a US-Mexico agreement
for the state of Florida, particularly
for agriculture, its second largest
industry.
It is widely recognized that
healthy economies in Latin America and the Caribbean translate
into profitable markets for US
products. Strong economies also
improve the chances of solving
hemispheric problems such as
drug trafficking and immigration.
But free trade must be fair trade.
In the case of agriculture, this
means negotiating a trade pact that
takes into consideration important
issues such as labor conditions,
chemical and pesticide regulation,
and food safety.
The decision by US president
George Bush and Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari to initiate trade talks means the US and
Mexico will negotiate for a period
of up to three years to eliminate
trade barriers. A trade pact between the US and Mexico, similar
to the recently ratified US-Canada
agreement, could make Mexican
goods more competitive than

Bob Graham is a US senatorfor the
state ofFlorida.
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goods from the Caribbean Basin.
Such a pact, then, could jeopardize
economic growth, as well as destabilize fledgling democracies,
throughout the Basin.

Since 1988 the Caribbean Basin
has experienced an unprecedented
election binge. Except for Cuba
and Haiti, democratic rule now prevails throughout the region. After a
decade of war and political turmoil, the US must help its friends
preserve their hard-won democratic gains. The best way to do so
is by fostering economic growth
through trade.

Regional Response
The US and its neighbors in the
Caribbean Basin should respond to
this challenge by asking what is in

their long-term collective economic interests. The debate must
begin in the Basin, which has the
most at stake. Since 1983, when the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) became law, the region has taken advantage of the program to gain
limited duty-free access to US markets and to attract new foreign investment. In 1990 the US Congress
passed and President Bush signed
a law strengthening CBI. The 1990
legislation:
* Makes permanent the region's
limited duty-free access to the US
market, which was to have expired in 1995.
" Expands duty-free treatment to
include the assembly or processing of fabricated components of
100% US origin. This change
would affect products ranging
from electronics to leather goods
such as shoes and handbags.
* Separates CBI countries from
other world markets for the purpose of determining injury to US
industries in unfair trade practices cases.
- Extends special treatment for
CBI ethanol products (i.e., fuel)
through 1992.
These are modest but useful
improvements. CBI supporters
wanted more but failed in the face
of strong resistance from the US
textile, apparel, and shoe industries. The Senate even defeated an
effort to reduce-not eliminateimport duties on inexpensive footwear Some US producers will
oppose a trade pact with Mexico
as well. Portions of agriculture and
the electronics industry are sure to
be among them. US negotiators
will have to address these concerns
if they are to forge an agreement
with Mexico that has the support of
the American people.

Im

Y

Yet some US economic sectors
as well as the CBI countries stand
to lose as a result of a free-trade
agreement between Mexico and
the US. Mexico already has two formidable built-in advantages over
the Caribbean Basin: a large,
trained labor force and a developed cross-border transportation
system that provides easy access to
the US market. Moreover, allowing
unrestricted entry of duty-free Mexican textiles and apparel into the
US could wipe out CBI gains under
the so-called Super 807 program,
which permits CBI quota-controlled imports of garments made
from 100% US cut and formed
fabric.
Caribbean Basin governments
need to decide whether to move
beyond CBI by seeking a free-trade
agreement with the US, either in
collaboration with Mexico or separately. Only they can make this
decision.
The region's countries are well
aware of the dangers posed by a
US-Mexico pact. That is why Costa
Rica, Panama, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Honduras are currently
negotiating with the US the outlines of possible free-trade agreements. The five Central American
presidents are expected to take up
the issue when they meet in December 1990, and Caribbean countries
are already discussing the feasibility
of a regional agreement with the
US. In the meantime, however, the
US should emphasize that it would
welcome a decision in favor of free
trade by the Caribbean Basin and
would be prepared to negotiate the
terms of such a pact. The US must
also begin to view its relationship
with the Caribbean Basin and Latin
America in a broader context of
mutual self-interest.

A New Era
The US is entering a new era
where its national security will be
increasingly defined in economic
rather than military terms. Using
this calculus, US economic interests in Latin America overwhelm its
economic interests elsewhere in
the world. Further, as Europe

moves toward economic integration in 1992 and as economic cooperation grows between the Pacific
Rim economic giants, the US must
recognize that economic integration in this hemisphere is in the
interests of both the US and its
neighbors.
As revolutionary change sweeps
across the USSR and Eastern Europe, it is easy to lose sight of these

facts. What is happening across the
Atlantic is, of course, extremely important. But so too is what is happening in the Americas.
This is not the time to walk
away It is time, rather, to help the
nascent democracies of the Americas to consolidate their new political institutions and to strengthen
their democratic gains through
economic growth. Once and for
all, the US must break its destructive habit of crisis-driven involvement in Latin America and the
Caribbean. How the US confronts
this regional challenge will have a
profound impact on the country's
future.
The US must play a leadership
role. The country's success will rest
largely on its ability to be a good
neighbor-to be attentive to the
economic changes sweeping the
world and sensitive to the ramifications for not only the US but the
hemisphere as well.
The completion of a free-trade
pact between the US and Canada
in 1989 was occasion for regional
applause. A similar agreement with
Mexico will be hard-wrought and
perhaps controversial, but it will
likely produce another round of
hemispheric applause. In its quest
to open a healthy trade relationship with Mexico, the US must not
torpedo economic gains by its
Caribbean neighbors. u
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Commentary

Bush's Andean Initiative
by Eduardo A. Gamarra

February 1990 Cartagena
agreement, the Bush administration and the
governments of Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru
claimed a significant victory in the
"war on drugs." US officials noted
that the Latin Americans had finally accepted the administration's
proposals to escalate repressive
antidrug activities. In turn, the Andean presidents noted that the US
had finally acquiesced to their
demands for an "alternative development policy" and increased economic aid. The Andean presidents
and President George Bush agreed
that responsibility for combatting
the "drug war" should be shared.
They also agreed that policy distinctions should be made between consumer, trafficker, and producer
nations.
In short order the Bush administration unveiled its Andean strategy to follow up on the promises it
made in Cartagena. Claiming that
drugs constituted the major security threat to the US, the administration unveiled a $2.2 billion
economic aid package for Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru. Nevertheless,
the administration conditioned
economic aid on the acceptance of
military aid by the three countries.
In a classic example of foreign
policy based on public opinion
polls, the Bush administration
aimed to score a quick Panamastyle victory over South American
drug lords. US strategy toward the
Andes, which was engineered principally by the Pentagon and the
State Department's Office of Inter-

EduardoA. Gamarrais an associate
editor of Hemisphere.
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national Narcotics Matters, moved
along two concurrent fronts. First,
the US exerted pressure on Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru to accept
military aid as a step toward the
deployment of their armed forces
in zones of conflict. Second, the
Pentagon crafted an antidrug plan
to engage the Department of Defense more directly in South American antidrug efforts. The so-called

"Thurman Plan" envisioned thatstrengthened by US-provided logistics, training, and equipment-the
armed forces of the three countries
would undertake coordinated attacks against cartel targets. Pentagon reports suggested that if Bush
gave the order, US special forces
would be sent to pursue Colombian drug lords.

Obstacles
Since the Cartagena summit, international factors as well as domestic conditions in the US and the
Andes have threatened to unravel
Bush's Andean initiative. Internationally the cost of deploying and
maintaining (perhaps indefinitely)
US troops in the Persian Gulf may

force the redistribution of funds
promised to the Andean campaign.
Many South Americans believe the
longer the Gulf Crisis, the greater
will be the leeway for Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru to emphasize
economic recovery and democratic
consolidation. Optimism about the
waning of US interest in the Andes,
however, must be tempered by the
knowledge that current programs
will not be stopped overnight.
In the US, intra-government turf
battles have also debilitated the Andean strategy. Agencies such as the
Drug Enforcement Administration
and Customs have been at loggerheads disputing the leadership role
of specific antinarcotics activities.
As an innumerable number of
agencies and departments enter
the drug war, turf battles are likely
to become more pronounced.
Until the Panama invasion of
December 1989, the US military
had not been receptive to the idea
of entering the drug war; since
then, General Maxwell Thurman,
the commander of the Southern
Command, has become the key
force behind Pentagon antidrug
initiatives. Apart from Thurman,
however, the Pentagon has few enthusiasts for military involvement
in the Andes. In private, Pentagon
officials concede that, if Thurman
(who is reported to be seriously ill)
were to step down, plans for US
military involvement would be
scrapped.
The US Congress is another
likely source of opposition to the
Andean strategy. A few members of
Congress, such as Peter H. Kostamayer (D-PA), have called for
scrapping the military component
of the strategy. Even some hardline
advocates of the drug war, like
Lawrence J. Smith (D-FL), have

expressed reservations about the
Andean initiative.
In the Andean region, opposition to US antidrug plans emanates
from governments and grassroots
movements. Such opposition revolves around the view that the US
has done little to support the nonmilitary options discussed at
Cartagena.
C&sar Gaviria, Colombia's new
president, pledged to continue Virgilio Barco's antidrug policy. Nonetheless, he has consistently argued
that because the drug problem is
an issue of law enforcement and
not of national security, Colombia
will no longer shoulder the human
costs of the drug war Moreover,
on September 3, 1990, Gaviria announced plans to forgo extradition
and cut prison sentences for drug
dealers who cooperate with authorities and help prosecute other traffickers.
The so-called "extraditables"
had announced in July that they
would unilaterally cease their wave
of violence if the Colombian government promised to review its
extradition policy. Drug-related
violence has plagued Colombia for
at least six years; however, since the
September 1989 murder of Luis
Carlos Galin and the launching of
a government offensive to capture
the drug lords, violence had increased to overwhelming levels.
Gaviria's modified strategy has resulted in a significant decrease in
violence. Consequently many Colombians believe that a strategy of
increasing repression and militarization of the antidrug offensive
may be less successful than peaceful alternatives.
Another reason for shifting
Andean attitudes was the trial of
Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, DC, who once advocated sending US troops to the Andes to end
the flow of drugs. Barry's conviction on lesser charges sent a mixed
message to the Andeans. The US
was prepared to capture, try, and
convict Bolivian, Colombian, and
Peruvian drug traffickers, claiming
the judicial systems in those coun-

tries did not work; its own justice
system, however, was lenient in its
treatment of prominent US citizens who violate antidrug laws. In
an ironic twist, Colombian president Gaviria accused the US of
lacking the will to fight drug trafficking.
Similar situations have developed in Bolivia and Peru. In May
1990 Bolivian presidentJaime Paz
Zamora, after vainly resisting pressures from the US State Department, signed Annex III to a 1987
US-Bolivia antidrug agreement.
A few weeks later he ordered the
Bolivian armed forces into the
Chapare Valley in return for
$33.2 million in US military aid
and promises that economic aid
would be disbursed. Even as Paz
Zamora denied the "militarization"
of the drug war, he ordered two
regiments to initiate antidrug operations. A large antimilitarization
effort had already been mounted
by opposition political parties,
labor, and campesino groups who
feared the consequences of such a
policy.
For example, in July and August
campesino unions carried out road
blockades and strikes, announced
the establishment of armed campesino defense committees, and
called on campesinos in general to
dodge compulsory military service.
In August, after signing an agreement with the campesino unions not
to militarize its antidrug efforts,
the government announced it
would not order troops into the
Chapare where confrontation with
peasants was inevtable. Instead it
would use US military aid to deploy
army units to monitor and prevent
ecological damage caused by cocapaste processing in the Bolivian
jungles.
Official Bolivian claims that the
solution to the drug war requires
more than guns, radars, and helicopters has enraged many in the
US International Narcotics Matters
Office, who believe the Bolivians
have reneged on previous commitments. US ambassador Robert
Gelbard has publicly reminded the

Bolivian government that economic aid will be disbursed only if
the military enters the drug war
Gelbard has also headed efforts to
delay the signing of trade and investment agreements as a way of
pressuring the Bolivian government into signing an extradition
agreement. Faced with a no-win
situation, Paz Zamora's government appears to be engaging in a
bit of double talk: he will comply
with US requirements but will
simultaneously attempt to convince
Bolivians that his government is
not giving in to the Americans.
Most disconcerting to the US
has been the ambivalence of Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori
about the military aid agreements
signed by his predecessor, Alan
Garcia. On September 12, Fujimori
announced his government would
not sign a $36-million military aid
package because it would commit
Peru to an emphasis on repression
rather than economic development. The Fujimori government
believes it must first address the issues of economic collapse, the
Sendero Luminoso and TupacAmaru
rebellions, and a generally hostile
political climate, before embarking
on a controversial military build-up
that could eventually undermine
formal civilian rule.

New Exports
The US would do well to listen to
Colombian president Gaviria's calls
for "more trade and less aid." The
announcement of Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
and that Andean economies would
be given preferential treatment under the General System of Preferences has raised expectations in
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. It
would be a shame to discover that
both initiatives were subordinated
to the war on drugs.
Washington must open the US
market to Andean products.
Failure to do so will result in the
Andean region's continued dependence on cocaine as its principal source of export revenue. *
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Poisoning Ecuador's Oriente
by Judith Kimerling and the Natural Resources Defense Council

Ecuador's Oriente-an
Amazonian region of vast
tropical rain forests and a
diverse indigenous population-has yielded a
wealth of oil export earnings to
both the government and multinational firms. The damage inflicted
on the Oriente, however, has been
massive. An estimated 1 million
hectares of rain forest have been
opened to colonization by incoming settlers. Spills from the TransEcuadoran Pipeline have dumped
an estimated 16.8 million gallons
of oil-compared to the 10.8 million-gallon Exxon disaster in Valdez, Alaska. To make matters
worse, the Oriente's oil wells generate more than 4 million gallons
of toxic waste every day. Nearly half
of Ecuador's oil reserves have been
extracted: at the current rate, the
Oriente has only 15 years of oil left.

Ecuadoran Policy
Neither Petroecuador, the state oil
company, nor the MinisteriodeEnergia y Minas has the capacity or will
to establish meaningful environmental regulation. Their weakness
is particularly worrisome in view of
the pressures on Ecuador to service
its bloated foreign debt and the current oil exploration and development initiatives by multinational
firms. Petroecuador and nine multinational firms are exploring more
than 3 million hectares; Conoco,

Judith Kimerling is an attorney with the
NaturalResourcesDefense Council
(NRDC), in New York City. She and
NRDC are the authors of "Amazon
Crude:Findings and Recommendations" (1990).
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Oryx (a subsidiary of Sun Oil), and
British Gas are already negotiating
terms of production.

Much of the area of proposed
production overlaps the boundaries of Yasuni National Park,
Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve, and
Limoncocha Biological Reserve, as
well as traditional indigenous
lands. All the more troubling are
three other matters. First, the
World Bank is preparing a loan to
Ecuador of $100 million, which
would be substantially increased by
anticipated co-financing, for expanded oil activities. Second, in
the near future the government is
expected to grant millions of hectares of new concessions spanning
the entire Oriente. And third, contracts specify that the foreign
companies relinquish their local
production facilities to Petroecuador after a 20-year period,
thereby leading them to extract
reserves as quickly as possible and
to invest little in maintenance.
Regarding the latter problem,
Conoco, which is preparing to extract oil from the lands of the
Huaorani Indians, predicts production will peak at 50,000 barrels

per day and then decline to less
than 8,000 per day when transferred to Petroecuador Similarly
the facilities Petroecuador recently
took over from Texaco are antiquated, in bad repair, and severely
contaminated. No oil company has
complied with a new requirement
by the Ministerio de Energiay Minas
that environmental impact statements be submitted and approved
before the initiation of exploration
or production activities. Some companies, such as Conoco, Petrocanada, and Occidental, have
made efforts to appear sensitive to
environmental concerns, promising more stringent controls than
those required by either Petroecuador or the newly created Subsecretariode Medio Ambiente. These
promises, nonetheless, fall short of
the minimum requirements in the
US and Canada.

Local Impact
The petroleum industry damages
the ecology of the Eduadoran
Amazon at every stage of development-from seismic exploration
and exploratory drilling through
production, transport, and refining. Furthermore, the industry
poses a grave threat to the physical
and cultural survival of the region's
indigenous peoples. Their traditional economies, which depend
on forest products and small-scale
shifting agriculture, are being undercut by deforestation and contamination.
For example, the oil-producing
areas of the northern Oriente are
home to the Quichua, Siona, Secoya, and Cofan peoples. Once a
zone of pristine rain forest, the
northern Oriente is now the site
of an industrial corridor, several

R

boom towns, uncontrolled colonization, extensive pollution, and
severe poverty. The opening of an
oil road has even spread these conditions into the Cuyabeno Wildlife
Reserve, which was previously set
aside for the Siona and Secoya
peoples and for the conservation
of its striking diversity of plant and
animal life. The colonists of the
northern Oriente, who migrate to
the Amazon region from impoverished coastal and mountain
areas, find rain forest soil is generally unsuitable for the cultivation
of cash crops such as coffee, naranjilla, and cocoa. In addition they
find the petroleum industry generates few employment opportunities.
Tens of thousands of such
colonists live in the shadows of oil
production facilities, where pollution worsens their plight. For one
thing, it has killed the fish that
used to serve as a major source of
protein, a key reason for estimated
malnutrition rates of 65-98%. Colonists claim pollution is also linked
to cancer, birth defects, and various other skin, gastrointestinal,
and respiratory diseases. According
to the World Bank, the zone's public services in general are woefully
inadequate.

A Sustainable Environment?
Ecuador's Oriente is clearly on a
course toward ecological and sociocultural disaster Such disaster
cannot be prevented unless the domestic and foreign groups responsible take decisive action now to
establish a sustainable environment.
The Ecuadoran government
should declare an "environmental
emergency" in the Oriente and a
moratorium on the development

T

of new oil fields. In so doing it
should create a broad-based independent commission, including
representatives of the indigenous
peoples and colonists of the Oriente as well as nongovernment
experts. The purpose of the commission would be the formulation
and management of a plan to
mend the region's ecological and
sociocultural damage and to minimize further destruction.

Texaco-since the early 1970s,
the dominant oil company in the
Oriente-should establish a $50million fund for initial environmental cleanup and remediation
in the region. Such a fund, which
amounts to a minute fraction of
Texaco's two decades of profits in
Ecuador, should be administered
by another broad-based independent committee.
The oil companies in the Oriente must revamp their operations
to prevent further contamination
and to maximize the efficiency of
already tapped reserves. They
should begin detailed chemical

S

sampling to provide a reliable
accounting of the composition,
quantity, and fate of all waste
streams and emissions, and to
develop waste handling and other
operational procedures to ensure
that production activities do not
threaten human health or the
environment.
The international community
should ease Ecuador's debt burden
so that the country can dedicate its
limited capital to the diversification
of the economy, the improvement
of living standards, and the cleanup of oil-producing areas. A starting point is Ecuador's proposal to
commercial bank creditors to buy
back a portion of its debt based on
secondary market prices and to restrict service payments to amounts
consistent with the goal of sustained real growth. More comprehensive debt reduction packages
should include environmental
terms, developed in consultation
with local nongovernmental organizations and representatives of
local communities. The US government should do its part by reducing its share of Ecuador's debt and
by allowing the funding of environmental projects in lieu of interest
payments.
Finally, the US-the world's
largest consumer of oil and the
largest importer of Ecuadoran oilshould conserve oil at home. For instance, by the year 2010 the US
could save the equivalent of seven
times the oil reserves of Ecuador by
implementing programs to insulate
buildings and replace furnaces and
water heaters. By the same year the
US could save the equivalent of 13
times the oil reserves of Ecuador by
boosting the fuel efficiency of cars
to 40 miles per gallon and light
trucks to 30 miles per gallon. .
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Reports: Criminal Justice

Letter to President Vinicio Cerezo
by Philip Benjamin Heymann

of Guatemala and their appointed cabinet members have
now made clear that they have
no intention of using their
that the powers,
elected and
leaders
own influence,
resources to help the courts and
prosecutors deal with terrorist
violence against sizeable segments
of the population: students, labor
leaders, human rights workers,
peasant leaders, political figures to
the left of center, and others. I will
explain in a moment my basis for
this conclusion, but first let me discuss why the conclusion requires us
to leave when much important
work remains to be done.
Harvard Law School's Center
for CriminalJustice, like the architects of the Administration ofJustice program, see the effort to help
the judicial authorities deal with
violence as, above all, part of an effort to bring democracy to Guatemala. But it is a peculiarly stunted
democracy that will survive if many
leaders to the left of the ruling
Christian Democratic Party, and
even some of its distinguished
members, are in danger of assassination, and neither the President, nor the Minister of Defense,
nor the Minister of Government,
nor the Attorney General has taken
actions showing any real determination to bring this terror to a halt.
Under current conditions there
can be no democracy for the
country-there can only be elections among a small privileged
club. Without free speech and a
right to organize for all non-violent
sectors of the country, claims of

Sbelieve

PhilipBenjamin Heymann is director
of the Centerfor CriminalJusticeat
HarvardLaw School.
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democracy are a sham. Democracy
cannot coexist with unpursued, unpunished terror
A law enforcement system can
be simply a means of social control
of the less privileged members of
a society or it can be a system of
criminal justice. It may or may not
be desirable, on the whole, to improve the capacity of a developing
nation to investigate and prosecute
crimes by its poorest and least
powerful sectors. It only becomes
something that can be recognized
as criminal justice, however, if that
effort succeeds in treating violent
acts by the wealthy and powerful as
subject to the law too. The effective
application of the law to only some
groups, particularly if they are the
poor and powerless, is not an objective worthy of international
support. It is also ultimately selfdefeating; for any effective law enforcement requires local popular
support by witnesses and victims.
A single judge or even a judge
accompanied by a prosecutor cannot be expected to investigate and
punish crimes of political terrorism
that, for all they know, may involve
military intelligence or elements of
the police. The political and substantive support of the elected
President, the Minister of Defense,
and the Minister of Government
(who is responsible for the police)
is necessary. Simply imagine the
United States or Italy or Germany
trying to deal with a serious terrorist threat without using the
police and without the powerful
commitment of elected leaders.
This point was made with absolute clarity two years ago when
an unusually dedicated and courageous Guatemalan police chief
furnished the courts with evidence
implicating high-level officials in

the security forces, who were accused "disappearing" students and
others in an infamous "death van."
The judge who was handling the
case was kidnapped. At the same
time a close associate of his was
brutally murdered. When the
judge was released, he in turn
released all the arrested members
of the Treasury Police. Despite international outcry, nothing was
said or done by the President, the
Minister of Defense, or the Minister of Government. The files of the
case have been kept secret ever
since, notwithstanding demands
from members of the U.S. Congress and promises by President
Cerezo to provide the file.
Not since that case have the
police, always led by military officers who are often from army
intelligence, undertaken an investigation that might reveal the involvement in political terror of the
police themselves or military intelligence. Indeed the likelihood of
this happening has been reduced
substantially by the creation of
new policing systems that include
the military police as integrated
participants in much of Guatemala's policing. And until recently
the head of detectives, a crucial
position for investigating terrorist
attacks, has been a former member
of army intelligence (as was the
present Chief of Police) Nor have
the security forces shown any great
willingness to investigate what may
be privately sponsored terrorism
from the right, although these elements may also be dangerous to
the leaders of Guatemala's government, as three recent coup attempts suggest.
Guatemala's leaders have, in the
last two months, revealed with painful clarity their unwillingness to
commit their political support or
their police resources, the two essential ingredients of an anti-terrorist effort anywhere in the
world-to dealing with a recent,
frightening burst of terrorist
violence, very largely against students, labor leaders, human rights
workers, peasant leaders, and politi-

cal figures. A dozen student leaders
and others associated with the
University of San Carlos have been
"disappeared." The bodies of almost half have now been found,
bearing signs of torture. Trade
union leaders, particularly those
associated with the Coca-Cola
union, have been tortured and
killed. Human rights workers have
met the same fate. Political leaders
have been killed. By universal
report nothing like this has happened in Guatemala since the very
dark days of the military repression. In the face of this, Guatemala's leaders have done nothing.
Amnesty International reports
various reasons for believing that
army intelligence may have been involved in many of these killings
and disappearances. The evidence
it cites is equally consistent with the
involvement of lower levels of the
military or some police forces
without high level consent. Such
groups still elude the control of the
top brass, as recent coup attempts
by rogue officers attest. More
powerful individuals and private
groups may be carrying out the
murders for their own political
agenda.
It does not matter which of
these possibilities is true. A government is responsible not only for
what it orders or assists but also
for its tolerance of violent crime
against others by favored or feared
groups. It seems clear to us that the
current government of Guatemala
is prepared to tolerate the familiar,
terrible forms of violent repression-disappearances, torture,
and death-carried out by private
groups or dissident security forces
or, perhaps, by the highest levels of
army intelligence. The United
States and other Western nations
have provided millions and millions of dollars to improve the
administration ofjustice in Guatemala in the last three years. The
Guatemalan government could
now count on a significant number
of trained prosecutors, judges, and
police investigators if it wanted to
punish the terror But it has not

taken, and shows no inclination to
take, the obvious steps that might
solve these crimes and rebut the
otherwise unmistakable conclusion
that the government accepts terror
against the non-violent left.
The steps it might have taken
are those that any democratic nation would take. The highest levels
of government should make
credible announcements of their
political resolve to fight the crimes,
including reference to the right of
members of groups expressing radical political views to live and speak
out. The intelligence branch of
the army, the most extensive and
trained information-gathering
network in Guatemala, should be
ordered to make whatever information it has available to the courts.
Special task forces of police and
prosecutors, selected so that they
could be trusted to perform honestly, should be created to devote
specialized effort and massive commitments of time to these priority
cases.
The student kidnappings are
pattern crimes, likely having been
committed by the same people
using more or less the same techniques. They require a number of
people and substantial logistics.
Witnesses reported the crimes and
were even able to report license
plate numbers on cars.
The crimes could be solved.
The first and most obvious steps
to solve them have not been taken.
There are lingering suspicions of
the involvement of military intelligence. The government of Guatemala has revealed its hand. Its
conception of reform in the criminal justice system does not include
making terrorist violence of the
sort that has occurred in the last
several months subject to the laws
of Guatemala and effective investigation and prosecution in the
courts of Guatemala.
Under the circumstances we
believe those interested in improvements in the criminal justice
systems of developing countries
can better use their efforts elsewhere. *
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Bush's Enterprising Initiative
by Richard E. Feinberg

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, unveiled on
June 27, 1990, contains a
series of major proposals
for trade liberalization
and debt reduction. By opening
markets, reducing debt service,
and promoting environmental conservation, the Bush initiative could
help to reinvigorate the region's
economy. Its impact, however, will
depend on Latin America's capacity to respond affirmatively and on
the way the initiative's proposals
are implemented.
No set of measures to stimulate
hemispheric trade and development would be credible unless it
promised to substantially reduce
the Latin American and Caribbean
debt burden, whose weight is lowering the region's living standards,
impeding its efforts at economic
reform, and constricting its import
capacity-to the disadvantage of
US exporters. The Bush initiative
addresses this fundamental prob-

lem by building upon the 1988
debt-reduction plan of US treasury
secretary Nicholas Brady. It extends the principle of debt reduction from bilateral debts owed by
low-income countries to bilateral
debts owed by middle-income countries-the category that subsumes
most of Latin America and the
Caribbean.
The initiative would make de
jure what has become de facto: the
nonpayment of many official debts.

RichardE. Feinbergis executive vice
president of the Overseas Development
Council, in Washington, DC. He is the
authorof The Intemperate Zone:

The Third World Challenge to US
Foreign Policy (W. W. Norton, 1983).
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LatinAmerican Debt Serc

In numerous cases actual cash flow
would not be significantly altered,
thereby minimizing the reduction
of US government revenues. Nonetheless, the cleansing of the books
and the regularizing of financial
transactions would be welcomed by
debtors and creditors alike.
How would the initiative reduce
the debt and debt service of Latin
America and the Caribbean? The
answer hinges on the program's implementation. The critical variables
are as follows:
* The amount of debt eligible for
reduction and the size of the discount.
* The degree of participation of
other bilateral donors.
* The terms of debtor-country
eligibility.

to te

S

Debt Reduction
Latin America and the Caribbean owe US government agencies
$12 billion. Almost 80% of this
total is owed to the US Agency for
International Development and
the US Eximbank, the remainder
being divided between Food for
Peace and the Commodity Credit
Corporation. Under current terms,
debt service on these claims will
equal $4.7 billion in 1991-94, or
$1.2 billion a year
The Bush administration has
not provided estimates of the size
of the discounts that would be applied to debts. Estimates by the
Overseas Development Council
(ODC) suggest that Latin America
and the Caribbean could save

$1.6 billion in 1991-94, or $400 million a year Savings of more than
$50 million for the entire period
would accrue to a number of countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, and

Jamaica.

Other Donors
Detailed information on Latin
American and Caribbean debts
to bilateral donors other than the
US is not available. Yet ODC estimates indicate that extending
the initiative to other bilateral
donors would yield an annual
debt-service savings of between
$1.6 and $2.3 billion.
Customarily, bilateral debts are
renegotiated under the aegis of the
Paris Club, the donors' cartel for
the renegotiation of governmentto-government loans. This arrangement assures equal treatment of all
bilateral donors; otherwise, concessions granted by one creditor
would make it easier for a debtor
to service the claims of competing
creditors. It would be an unfortunate break with tradition if the
US were to forgive bilateral debts
without other donor countries
doing so as well. The debt-reducing
impact of the Bush proposals will
be greatest if they assume multilateral form within the Paris Club
framework.

this proposal is a reversal of US
policy depends on the unspecified
meaning of "appropriate." A pathbreaking aspect of the Brady plan
was that it severed the link between
the actions of official agencies and
the signing of agreements between
a debtor country and its commercial creditors. This link had placed
commercial banks in the enviable
position of being able to block official programs and loans, thus augmenting their bargaining power at
the expense of the flexibility of official agencies. The Bush initiative
should not be held hostage to the
bargaining strategies of commercial banks.
The second addition is that the
debtor country must "have put in
place major investment reforms in
conjunction with an IDB [InterAmerican Development Bank]
loan or otherwise be implementing
an open investment regime." This
addition might do more than delay
putting the Bush program into action; during the interim it could
also tempt debtor countries to run

up arrears. Whether this addition
restricts eligibility is contingent on
the content of the proposed reforms. But is such a requirement
necessary? As it stands now, the
IMF and World Bank reform programs already contain the essential
measures a debtor government
must take to create a favorable investment climate.
Imposing a set of extra considerations would merely delay
debt reduction-and hence delay a
catalyst to investment-as well as irritate Latin American and Caribbean leaders. As such it could cost
the US government the good will
that the Bush initiative has generated throughout the hemisphere.
But while it was appropriate for the
US to take the lead in advocating
additional debt reduction measures, the Paris Club should require
the participation of all industrial
nations. Our allies should shoulder
their fair burden of reducing old
debts-since they also stand to
benefit from a more prosperous
Latin America. *

Mexican Academic ClearingHouse
(MACH)

Eligible Countries
Debt reduction is typically granted
only when a debtor country adheres to a program of economic
reform monitored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, or both. The
Bush administration, however, is
proposing to add two more conditions, a stance that could seriously
delay implementation of the initiative.
The first addition would require
that, "if appropriate," a debtor
country must "have agreed with its
commercial lenders on a satisfactory financing program." Whether

Materiales Acadimicos de Consulta
Hispanoamericana/Mexican Academic Clearing House (MACH)
has been exporting library materials worldwide since 1969.

* MACH sells single and multiple copies of Mexican books
and serials, including government publications.
* MACH handles selective blanket order services for
academic libraries.
* MACH gives free referral service and periodical book
lists.
Write for further information to MACH, Apartado Postal 13-319, Delegaci6n
Benito Juarez, 03500, Mexico, D.F Telephone numbers (915) 674-0567 and
(915) 674-0779.
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Cultivating Exports
by Charles Thurston

F

companies took a chance
on Chile's wine industry
in the 1980s. They found
the choice was a good
rench,
US
one, butSpanish,
not for and
the
reason that many of them planted
money there originally.
Investors put their money into
Chile and other South American
countries with the hope the domestic market for fine wines would
take off dramatically. That hasn't
happened. What has sharpened
significantly is the US taste for
South American wines, especially
from Chile. Exports have grown
markedly.
According to figures from the
National Association of Beverage
Importers (NABI)-based on US
Customs data-table wine imports
from Chile have risen 86%: up
from 750,000 gallons in 1988 to
1.39 million gallons in 1989. That
rise was the fastest among US foreign suppliers active in the market
in both years, NABI indicates.
Sales accelerated further in
1990. During the first six months,
Chilean exports nearly doubled to
1 million gallons compared with
560,000 during the same period in
1989, says NABI president Robert
Maxwell. Chile is now the fourthlargest supplier of wine to the US,
following Italy, France, and Germany, and has displaced other traditional large-volume European
suppliers like Portugal and Spain.
One US company that is particularly pleased with the US demand
for Chilean wines is Banfi Vintners
in Old Brookville, New York, which
acquired exclusive distribution

Charles Thurston is a senior correspondentfor theJournalof Commerce.

12

Hemisphere * Fall 1990

rights to the Concha y Toro label
in 1988. US imports of the line of
13 wines nearly doubled from
125,000 cases in 1988 to 300,000
cases in 1989 (and to an estimated
500,000 cases in 1990), according
to Carm Tintle, a marketer for
Banfi. Exports by Concha y Toro
now represent more than half of
all Chilean wine exports to the US,
he says.

One crucial element of the
global wine market dynamic that
has aided Chilean wines in the US
is exchange rate. While European
exporters have been forced to absorb translation losses resulting
from the relative decline of the dpllar there, profit margins for South
American exporters, for whom currencies are tied to the dollar, have
been safer
"One of the great factors of
(Chilean) success is that prices are
pegged to the dollar," Tintle says.

Chilean wines are generally priced
in the $3 to $10 range in retail
stores.

Big Dollar Value
"A dollar is a dollar in South
America and it has tremendous
value there," comments Juan
Larraguibel, president of Los
Andes Importers in Ardsley, New
York. Labor costs in Chile are only
15-20% of US rates, which allows
wines from the fertile Maipo Valley
to compete readily with Californian
products.
But a competitive product does
not necessarily command market
share in a mature-and slowly
shrinking-US market. After several difficult years of marketing
Chilean wines, Larraguibel says he
has found strong US market acceptance in 1990 for Chilean Cabernet
Sauvignon, Chardonnay, and other
noble varieties under the Casa de
Lara label, which he imports exclusively.
Part of the reason for the current success of Chilean wines is the
heritage of the product. Chilean
wines show a strong French influence, with much of the root
stock grown on vines brought from
France before the great phylloxera
plague that wiped out much of
Europe's vineyards in the late
18 7 0s.
Because of its quality, Chilean
wine is being marketed to compete
with high-quality California wines.
Capitalizing on the appeal of the
two regions, Banfi, for example,
has blended the exotic Chilean
image with the sure-selling California label, marketing a line under
the stylized Walnut Crest label for
Bodegas y Vinedos Santa Emiliana,
a Concha y Toro affiliate.

Cautioning that volume gains
do not necessarily mean lower
quality wine, John Laird, executive
vice president of sales for New Yorkbased Seagram Chateau & Estate
Wines Co., says the current surge
in US consumption of Chilean
wines "is not the same as the Australian boom (and bust) of a few
years ago, when the wine offered
displayed a big robust kind of style,
more so than Californian wine.

Chilean wine is a substitute for
European archetypes."
"One should not damn the
achievement that Chile is now the
fourth-largest wine supplier (to the
US)," says Laird. "I don't think that
anyone is buying wine because it's
Chilean. Chilean wine happens to
be (selling for) a very good price
and the taste appeals to a qualityconscious wine drinker "
But the source of the wine may

have more to do with the success of
Chile's product than Laird will
admit. As an importer of Argentinean wines, Larraguibel notes
commercial US customers often
double up when purchasing South
American imports so that they have
a broad regional offering. m

Editor'sNote: Adaptedfrom theJournal of Commerce, September 5, 1990.

Feeding the Crisis The Heritage
U.S. FoodAid and Farm Policy of the
in Central America
Conquistadors
Rachel Garst and Tom Barry

Garst and Barry assert that U.S. food
shipments and assistance in agricul-

Ruling Classes in Central
America from
Conquest to the Sandinistas

tural development are hurting rather
than helping the social and economic
crisis in Central America. They reveal
lava Maung/Impact Visuals

the negative effects of U.S. food policy
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"Trenchant observations on why
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failed in each country are coupled
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American and European responses to
Central American conflicts are
interesting reading." - Richard E.
Greenleaf, Director of Latin American
Studies, Tulane University $35.00
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Insider briefs on people and institutions
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs

Rights Across the Border

Watch Out

Mexico's foreign ministry has
urged its US-based consuls to
promote the rights of the 20 million Mexicans who live north of the
border The ministry's Direcci6n
GeneralparaAtenci6n de Ciudadanos
Mexicanos en el Extranjero has
presented new guidelines on the
matter to Mexico's 50 US-based
consuls. Recognizing the importance of the financial contributions
of Mexicans employed in the US,
the ministry warns that if this
group is not "recuperated," it will
become fully incorporated into
the fabric of US society. "Mejiamerica
is for us the most important nation with which we have
to improve our relations."

The Persian Gulf Crisis will have
major repercussions for Latin
America's 1990 trade balance.
Every increase of $1 in the price
of a barrel of petroleum represents
additional export income of about
$1.3 billion per year and an increase of nearly $500 million in
import costs for Latin America in
general. ECLAC (CEPAL News,
Vol. X, No. 9) projects an upturn
in the value of the region's exports
by as much as $3 billion in 1990,
bringing the trade surplus on
goods to some $26 billion.

Don't Look at Me
Colombians will finally have the opportunity to rectify many of their
constitution's long-standing
problems. Following the election
of delegates to a constitutional assembly in December 1990, they will
meet between February 5 and July
4, 1991, to develop a series of
amendments to the 1889 document. Why the changes? A Reuter's
story (October 22, 1990) reports
that Colombia's institutional
mechanisms are widely regarded as
antiquated and responsible for the
country's corruption and violence
as well as other problems. The judicial system, in particular, is targeted for large-scale reform.

Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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Quick Quiz
Mexico's leading export to the
US is oil-in 1989 nearly $4 billion
worth. But what is the leading US
export to Mexico? In 1989 US
exports of motor vehicle parts
and accessories jumped from almost $300 million to more than
$900 million. According to the
Washington Report on Latin America
& the Caribbean(October 1990),
"the quantity of US exports in [this
sector] is expected to continue to
grow as a result of several [liberalizing] rules Mexico has put in place
this year "

Where Were You When
I Needed You?
Spain's Ministry of Culture, IBMSpain, and the Ram6n Areces Foundation are computerizing 9 million
pages of the General Archive of the
Indies in Spain. When completed
in 1992, 40% of the most sought-

after documents will be available
to researchers through video
terminals housed in the Casa de
Lonja, a 16th-century building that
originally served as a trading center
in Sevilla.

ItWas Inevitable
The Washington-based InterAmerican Quincentennial Fund
may be the first to promote "handsome t-shirts" commemorating the
500th anniversary of the encounter
of two worlds. Given the "hype"
that has already developed around
the festivities, we can expect a dizzying array of trinkets, mugs, pennants, pendants, posters, flags,
book bags, specially minted coins,
limited edition plates, and maybe
even Chris Columbus look-alike
dolls. Fund shirts are colorful
and thoughtful, but don't underestimate the depth of tastelessness
to which some merchandisers may
sink as the October 1992 event
nears.

Thumb's Up on Folk Music
A ChristianScience Monitor (November 1, 1990) review of Los
Folkloristasgives high marks to the
Mexico-based group of musiciansingers. The article states that its
Latin American folk music "is as
varied as rain forest fauna" and
that "affection gleams through
each song." With some 20 albums
to its credit, the group periodically
performs concerts in the US. Its
next US tours will be in February

and April 1991

F

I

Consenting Partners
Canada is abandoning its traditional stance of low-profile relations with Latin America and the
Caribbean. On the heels of its 1988
free-trade agreement with the US,
Canada joined the OAS. Now it is
participating in discussions with
Mexico and the US to prepare for
negotiations on a North American
trade bloc. To monitor and promote regional trade, the CanadaLatin America Forum has been
organized in Canada under the auspices of the North-South Institute.
According to a Forum document
(September 28, 1990), "there is
growing public interest in the
North American menage a trois."

Worth Reading
The 1980 Mariel boat lift brought
120,000 new residents from Cuba
to the US, some of whom are now
being deported back to Cuba because of their hard-core criminal
records. An inside account of the
trials and travails of a "Marielito"
can be found in Christine Bell's
The Perez Family (W W Norton,
1990) The Miami-based story relates the difficulties and adventures
encountered by Juan Rauil Perez, a
former political prisoner in Fidel
Castro's jails.

Fast Start
Peter Cleaves, a former Ford Foundation representative in Mexico,
left the scholarly world for the
private sector in 1982. Now he's
back as director of the Institute of

L

Latin American Studies at the University of Texas. One of Cleaves's
first acts as director was to coordinate a meeting between Mexican
president Carlos Salinas de Gortari
and UT officials, which was held in
Mexico in October 1990. New collaborative efforts were identified
and agreed upon, including the
visit of senior Mexican government
officials to UT's campus in April
1991 to participate in a conference
on education.

Well-Endowed
Mexican secretary of eduction
Manuel Bartlett and US deputy
secretary of state Lawrence
Eagleburger signed an agreement on November 27, 1990, to
establish the US-Mexico Commission for Education and Cultural
Exchange. The commission will
support postgraduate university exchanges and research projects in
the arts, humanities, and social and
natural sciences. Funding in 1991
will be $3 million, making it the
largest nonprofit organization promoting educational and cultural
exchange between the US and
Mexico.

For Your Information
The Courier:Africa-CaribbeanPacificEuropean Community is an informative bimonthly magazine of the
General Secretariat of the ACP
Group of States of the European
Community. The SeptemberOctober 1990 issue carries a superb
set of articles on Barbados's economic and trade environment as
well as the prospects for higher

E

education in the Caribbean. Contact the ACP Group at Avenue
Georges Henri, 451, 1200 Brussels,
Belgium.

On the Move
Muni Figueres, formerly Costa
Rica's minister of foreign trade,
has been named chief of the Integration and Trade Development
Division in the Inter-American Development Bank's Economic and
Social Development Department.
Henry Gil, outgoing deputy permanent secretary of the Latin American Economic System, has been
invited by the OAS to participate in
the commission to examine the
future role of the Inter-American
System and to prepare a report for
the June 1991 OAS General Assembly, to be held in Santiago,
Chile.
Alma Guillermoprieto, a frequent
writer for the New Yorker, has been
named the 1990 Maria Moors
Cabot Prize winner by Colombia
University. The prize is awarded to
those who advance sympathetic understanding and freedom of the
press among the peoples of the
Western Hemisphere.
Anthropologist Larissa A. Lomnitz
and political scientist Fernando
L6pez Camarra, both from the
UniversidadNacional Aut6noma de
Mexico, were named co-winners of
Mexico's 1990 Premio Universidad
NacionaL The award recognizes distinguished careers of social science
research. Lomnitz is a member of
Hemisphere's editorial advisory
board.
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Disarming Politics
by Luis P Salas

ber 1989 US invasion, Panamanian politics revolves around a
core issue: the transformation
of the country's military into a
n
the aftermath
of the
DecemWhat
bepolice force.
civilian
in
the
gan as a small police force
early 1900s, after Panama separated from Colombia, evolved by
the 1950s and '60s into the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), the
country's dominant political institution. Given the local power of a
white oligarchy, this evolution provided a channel of upward political
and economic mobility for the nonwhite masses. It occurred, moreover, under the aegis of the US
government, which flexed its
muscles in the context of power
vacuums in Panama and Washington's interests in controlling the
Canal and containing communism
in Central America. Yet US policy
backfired in the 1980s when Washington winked at the corruption
and ignored the repression of the
Noriega regime (1982-89) in exchange for Panamanian support of
the US anti-Sandinista policy. In a

Luis P Salas, a Hemisphere contributingeditor, is directorofFlorida
IntenationalUniversity's Centerfor the
Administration ofJustice. He is the
author ofAdministraci6n deJusticia
en Costa Rica (SanJosi:EDUCA,

1988).
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twist of irony, the US invaded Panama not only to oust Noriega but to
dissolve the Panamanian military
into a civilian police force.

What Now?
Curiously the blueprint for the US
invasion did not plan beyond the
elimination of the PDF and the capture of Noriega. In their haste to
launch the military action, the invasion managers overlooked an earlier design that called for reservist
US military police to patrol Panama's streets. Furthermore the planners did not assume that a civilian
government would be installed immediately. The collapse of the PDF
and the absence of US military patrols permitted mobs to ransack
government offices and private
businesses for several days. The
sight of looting in the presence of
US troops has not been forgotten
by Panamanians, who blame Washington for the widespread damages.
Having accomplished its military objectives, the US turned to
the formidable task of assisting in
the development and consolidation of a civilian government. The
new Panamanian government--a
fragile alliance of parties united by
the goal of ousting Noriegasought to coalesce its power and
establish its legitimacy as foreign
troops patrolled its streets. In addition it faced the possibility of

armed resistance and popular
revenge against the PDF and its
supporters.
The challenge confronted by
President Guillermo Endara was
that of asserting control over the
nation's territory as quickly as possible while simultaneously assuming an antimilitary stance. Given
the anarchy in the streets and the
desire to reduce the visibility of US
troops, Endara gave highest priority to the establishment of a Panamanian security apparatus. One
option was to abolish the PDF
machinery and constrict a new
force through civilian recruits.
Another was to erect a new force
upon the PDF's foundations-that
is, to convert the military into a
civilian police force. The Endara
government chose the latter and
Washington acceded.
Several reasons informed the
choice. To begin with, the rebuilding of a police force from scratch
would have required a massive investment in training. Further, it
was politically urgent that US
troops be removed from the
streets. Many officials were concerned with the threat posed by
the dispersal of 16,000 armed and
trained men from the defeated
army. A few senior Panamanian officials believed that most of the
PDF's members had not been associated with Noriega's corruption
and human rights abuses.

S

In charge of implementing the
strategy was Vice President Ricardo
Arias Calder6n, the minister of
government and justice. Arias
encouraged PDF soldiers, including those senior officers deemed
relatively untainted by association
with Noriega, to join the newly
created "Public Force." Arias
presided over the dissolution of
some PDF units and the transfer of
others, such as the presidential
guard and a health-services battalion, to appropriate ministries.
The bulk of the PDF was assigned
to Arias's Ministry of Government

military" (Journalof World Affairs,
1990, p. 9) Meanwhile specialists
in the US military have concluded
that, under any arrangement,
the Canal would be defenseless
against sabotage or missiles. And,
as acknowledged in Panama and
the US, Washington possesses
treaty rights to intervene in
defense of the Canal. Thus Panamanian critics, such as I. Roberto
Eisenmann Jr., editor of the newspaper La Prensa,argue that there is
no justification for granting the
Public Force a military role.

i
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actions, power remains concentrated in a national police force.
Another problem is suspicion
of Arias himself. Members of the
Public Force owe their organizational survival to him; in defending
them he risked his political future.
The loyalty Arias may command
within the Public Force is feared by
many Panamanians. For one thing,
he is the potential beneficiary of
the votes the Public Force members and their families can cast in
future elections. For another, control over the armed forces has always been the key to nolitical
ower in Panama.
To be sure, the Endara governient has demonstrated its commit.
...
police force's gradual
an. In October 1990 the
Public Force, Colonel
rrera Hassan, was recommand. Hassan's
nother colonel, lasted
ays after publicly crititi-Public Force newsr After several civilians
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and in town meetings conducted
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tions in several Caribbean Basin
pel the government to negotiate
those who possess such training are
governments "not only failed to
with former PDF members. Alwilling to become involved. In this
clean up the police, but it contribthough this may have been an
setting, many argue that, despite
uted significantly to corrupting the
isolated event, it presents the posNoriega's downfall and Arias's
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new Panamanian government--a
fragile alliance of parties united by
the goal of ousting Noriegasought to coalesce its power and
establish its legitimacy as foreign
troops patrolled its streets. In addition it faced the possibility of

the dispersal of 16,000 armed and
trained men from the defeated
army. A few senior Panamanian officials believed that most of the
PDF's members had not been associated with Noriega's corruption
and human rights abuses.

S

In charge of implementing the
strategy was Vice President Ricardo
Arias Calder6n, the minister of
government and justice. Arias
encouraged PDF soldiers, including those senior officers deemed
relatively untainted by association
with Noriega, to join the newly
created "Public Force." Arias
presided over the dissolution of
some PDF units and the transfer of
others, such as the presidential
guard and a health-services battalion, to appropriate ministries.
The bulk of the PDF was assigned
to Arias's Ministry of Government
and Justice, which now administers
most of the PDF's former responsibilities (e.g., immigration, police,
corrections, fire, air force, and
navy) The size of the Public Force
is about 13,000 members, compared to the PDF's 16,000 members under Noriega.
Arias has repeatedly affirmed
that Panama now has a police
force-not an army. Nevertheless,
as the sole defender of national
security, the Public Force has a
clear military mission. In justifying
this mission, Arias claimed that
drug traffickers linked to Noriega
and remnants of the latter's
paramilitary "dignity battalions"
presented a threat to Panama's
security. As further justification,
Arias mentioned Panama's treaty
responsibility for defense of the
Canal.
These justifications have been
challenged by foreign analysts as
well as the Panamanian press. According to US observer Richard
Millett, the Washington-sponsored
fusion of police and military functions in several Caribbean Basin
governments "not only failed to
clean up the police, but it contributed significantly to corrupting the

military" (Journalof World Affairs,
1990, p. 9) Meanwhile specialists
in the US military have concluded
that, under any arrangement,
the Canal would be defenseless
against sabotage or missiles. And,
as acknowledged in Panama and
the US, Washington possesses
treaty rights to intervene in
defense of the Canal. Thus Panamanian critics, such as I. Roberto
Eisenmann Jr., editor of the newspaper La Prensa, argue that there is
no justification for granting the
Public Force a military role.

Obstacles
A major problem in building the
Public Force is that few civilians
have been trained in issues of
public security. Moreover, given
the widespread antimilitary sentiment reflected in opinion polls
and in town meetings conducted
by the National Assembly, few of
those who possess such training are
willing to become involved. In this
setting, many argue that, despite
Noriega's downfall and Arias's

actions, power remains concentrated in a national police force.
Another problem is suspicion
of Arias himself. Members of the
Public Force owe their organizational survival to him; in defending
them he risked his political future.
The loyalty Arias may command
within the Public Force is feared by
many Panamanians. For one thing,
he is the potential beneficiary of
the votes the Public Force members and their families can cast in
future elections. For another, control over the armed forces has always been the key to political
power in Panama.
To be sure, the Endara government has demonstrated its commitment to the police force's gradual
civilianization. In October 1990 the
head of the Public Force, Colonel
Eduardo Herrera Hassan, was relieved of his command. Hassan's
successor, another colonel, lasted
only a few days after publicly criticizing an anti-Public Force newspaper editor After several civilians
turned down the job, Endara appointed Ebrahim Asvat, an attorney and Arias confidant, as the
Public Force's interim head. Shortly thereafter, Arias fired 142 officers. The assignment of a civilian
to the post and the dismissal of so
many officers without major institutional repercussions augur well for
civilian control.
Nevertheless, in October 1990
the Endara government uncovered
a plot allegedly led by Herrera's
brother to hold back the troops in
Chirriqui province while public
demonstrations were taking place.
The motive, it seems, was to compel the government to negotiate
with former PDF members. Although this may have been an
isolated event, it presents the pos-
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sibility of further rumblings from
the old military establishment. In
so doing it reinforces the fears of
critics who want the Public Force
purged of all PDF elements.

The US Role
Following the December 1989
invasion, the US military was Panama's only source of aid. This assistance was to have ended with the
arrival of US civilian advisors.
Delays in the availability of nonmilitary assistance funds, however,
have meant that the US military
continues to supply commodities,
such as $500,000 in police cars, to
the Public Force.
By January 1990 US civilian advisors began to arrive. Among the
first were advisors from the Drug
Enforcement Agency who, besides
preparing Washington's legal case
against Noriega, arranged for the
dismantling of the PDF narcotics
unit and assisted in the training of
new personnel. Another arriving
contingent was the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the
Department ofJustice. ICITAP's
mission was to assist in the PDF's
restructuring into a civilian police
force. To this end, ICITAP received $1.2 million from the Urgent Assistance for Democracy in
Panama Act of 1990, and has requested $5.2 million for first-year
assistance to Panama. Congress approved another $9.3 million, which
had been previously earmarked as
military assistance pipeline funds,
for the purchase of law enforcement equipment.
While the technical training
value of these activities is undeniable, it must be remembered that
the PDF had been one of the Caribbean Basin's most corrupt security
forces. It must also be remembered
that US assistance in the development and training of Panama's
security force was nothing new;
after all, the US trained the PDF
and Noriega himself. In light of the
latter fact, journalist Frederick
Kemper commented: "As with so
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many other Latin American military officers, the American training
was more successful in teaching
him [Noriega] the technical skills
of how to control the Panamanian
population than in transmitting
democratic ideas and procedures"
(Foreign BroadcastInformation Serv-

ice, February 21, 1990, p. 29)

Still another complication is
that the presence of the Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) in Panama continues to send mixed signals to the country's armed forces.
Indeed, it remains difficult to distinguish whether US policy emanates from the US Embassy or
SOUTHCOM. For instance, the
appointment of Ambassador
Deane Hinton, a tough career
diplomat, was meant to bolster the
leadership authority of the Embassy in the eyes of the Panamanians
while diminishing that of the US
military. Nonetheless, US military
commanders maintain their appetite for public statements on Panamanian political issues. Hence,
in a May 1990 speech to the Union
Club and the Rotary Club, retiring
general Marc Cisneros commented

on the need for a Panamanian
army and the threat posed by the
guerrilla movement M-20.

The Political Key
When the Public Force was first
placed on the streets, its members
faced a hostile public: these were
the same men who had abused
them for years. The Public Force's
members, on the other hand, were
the demoralized remnants of a
defeated army, serving under the
command of those who had been
their enemies and supervised by
the army that had defeated them.
These same tensions remain, compounded by a lagging economy
and rising crime rates.
It is unlikely that another
military government will emerge
in Panama in the near future. Still,
as domestic conditions deteriorate,
the postinvasion honeymoon with
the Endara administration and the
US is ending. Increasingly, then,
Panamanians are calling for US
reparations for invasion damage.
Further, controversy over the Public Force is straining the ruling
coalition, especially relations between Vice President Guillermo
Ford and Vice President Arias.
Washington may once again be assuming its role as mediator in Panamanian politics-thereby exposing
itself to the hazards of decades past.
The key issue is not whether
Panama has a military or a police,
but whether armed force-under
either guise-remains a basic feature of domestic politics. In a historical context of US intervention,
Panama's legacy of governance
through armed force is a product
of an underdeveloped economy
and a highly stratified racial order
This set of circumstances spawned
the PDF-in no small part as an
avenue of upward political and
economic mobility for the nonwhite majority. Unless local initiative undertakes serious reform of
the country's economic, class, and
racial structures, Panama's quest
for democracy will once again yield
to governance by armed force. *

Hope Restored
by I. Roberto Eisenmann Jr.

long and hard against
the regime of General
Manuel Antonio Noriega
and for the establishment
of democracy. Their
struggle was spontaneous, with no
crystallized leadership. Though initiated by the middle classes, it
quickly generated support across
the class structure. Such support
included the business class, which
instead of fleeing the country, assumed an active role in the quest
for democracy. What emerged
was Latin America's first clearly
nonviolent political movement,
which rendered Panama ungovernable for Noriega and his
narco-military machine while internationally isolating the regime
on a multi-ideological plane. In
world affairs, Noriega became a
pariah for the political left, center,
and right.

May 1989 election supervised by
more than 300 international observers, had received a decisive
popular mandate. Consequently
Panama's political system returned
to its tradition of democracy, tossing aside its historical parenthesis
of dictatorship.

On the Agenda

Noriega's Exit
The question was not whether
the Noriega regime would survive.
Rather it was how, when, and at
what cost the downfall would occur Noriega's repressive response
not only escalated domestic opposition but provoked a US military invasion. The invasion was tragic in
terms of lives and property. Nevertheless, most Panamanians welcomed the US intervention as
having saved the country from a
more prolonged struggle and an
even higher cost in lives. The US
invasion made possible the installation of a government that, in the

I. Roberto EisenmannJr.is editor of
La Prensa, in Panama.

its ministers are respected as honest and hard-working. The government's budget is balanced, the
Panama Canal Treaty is back on
track, and business is again showing signs of vigor In the latter
respect, the banking sector has
implemented major reforms, the
commercial sector is almost fully
recovered, the construction industry is on the rebound, and a
promising new stock market has
opened. The most likely sector
of major job creation is exportassembly manufacturing.

President Guillermo Endara's
government is clearly legitimate,
and the new supreme court is clearly independent and formed by justices of the highest integrity. The
legislature is working effectively,
including an active minority of
former Noriega operatives. The
cabinet may be elitist, but most of

There are, of course, many concerns. To begin with, Panamanian
politics must involve more than
power-seeking and patronage, and
goverment officials must demonstrate the leadership necessary to
harness the country's obvious energy. Instead of talking the government must act; and its actions
should reflect the mandate of
the May 1989 election results.
Di6genes de la Rosa, one of Panama's elder statesmen, called that
election "the Panamanian people's
Act of Clarity." The elected government should strive for clarity,
avoiding the tangled web of oldstyle politics and earning popular
faith in the new democratic institutions.
No less important is the creation
of a truly civilian police force. Opinion polls confirm that the vast
majority of the citizenry wants such
change and wants it now-before it
is too late. The US invasion was
liberating, but it opened a gaping
wound in Panama's national
psyche, whose bleeding could become more profuse with the passing of time. The only medication
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that can truly stop the bleeding
and heal the wound is Panama's
demilitarization.
Democratic leadership and
demilitarization go hand in hand
with a series of other necessary
changes. For one thing, the inadequacy of the justice system is causing public frustration to reach
dangerous levels. A new penal code
is in order and due process must
be guaranteed if national reconciliation is to take place. A new
constitution is yet another necessity. Such a document should be
produced by a constituent assembly-the simplest and most effective way to achieve participatory
democracy.
Finally, the problems of poverty
and unemployment should rank
among the government's highest
priorities. The new economic
program announced by Vice President Guillermo Ford should be promoted vigorously. The message to
labor and business should be clearpaternalistic protection and handouts are things of the past. Legislation that protects the employed
should take second place to that
which fosters new employment.
More generally policy should
create an economic environment
that favors competitive industry,
not inefficient industry whose
survival depends on state intervention.

The Citizenry Speaks
Now that hope has been restored,
Panama has the opportunity to become Latin America's most successful participatory democracy. After
21 years in opposition, however,
Panama's political leaders must
rise to a new challenge-the challenge of governing.
Whatever happens, Panama's
leaders must recognize that the
citizenry does not want a strong
government. Twenty-one years of
dictatorship have cured them of
that. What the Panamanian people
want and need is a government
that listens and, with calm and
steadiness, acts. a

20

Hemisphere Fall 1990

PTm

UR

P RES

Edited and translated with

additional selections by

Robert Edgar Conrad
Based on the Spanish edition
by Sergio Ramfrez
For the first time in English,
here are the impassioned words
of the Nicaraguan hero and
martyr Augusto C. Sandino, for
whom the recent revolutionary
regime was named. From 1927
until 1933 American Marines
fought a bitter jungle war in
Nicaragua, with Sandino as
their guerrilla foe. The documents that make up this book
constitute a spontaneous
autobiography, a record not
only of Sandino's life but also of
a crucial and often overlooked
aspect of the relationship
between Nicaragua and the
United States.
Paper: $17.95 ISBN 0-691-02319-0
Cloth: $55.00 ISBN 0-691-07848-3

Engendering Democracy in Brazil
Women's Movements in Transition Politics
Sonia E. Alvarez
In the last twenty years, Brazil has witnessed the emergence and
development of perhaps the largest, most diverse, most radical, and most
successful women's movement in contemporary Latin America. This book tells
the compelling story of the rise of progressive women's movements amidst the
climate of political repression and economic crisis enveloping Brazil in the
1970s, and it devotes particular attention to the gender politics of the final
stages of regime transition in the 1980s.
"This is an intelligent and scintillating book-a superior contribution
both to the burgeoning literature on women and politics and to our
understanding of Brazilian and Latin American politics."
-Scott Mainwaring,Helen Kellogg Institutefor InternationalStudies
Paper. $15.95 ISBN 0-691-02325-5
Cloth: $39.50 ISBN 0-691-07856-4

A

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST. * PRINCETON, NJ 08540 * (609) 258-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

So, What Did Happen?
by Peter Eisner

the invasion of Panama,
a wide-eyed public affairs
officer told hundreds of
US and foreign journalists detained at a US army
base that there was no news. "You
might as well go home," he said.
Some of those assembled were
reporters who normally cover Panama but were off station when the
27,000 US troops invaded in December 1989. Hardly any foreign
correspondents were already in the
country. The US military held most
of the journalists who scrambled into Panama on a tight leash for the
first few days, far from the battle
lines at Howard Air Force Base.
The lucky few who were already on
station-including the Pentagon
pool reporters secretly flown to
Panama-complained they were
systematically blocked from getting
anywhere near the action.
By the end of Operation Just
Cause, many reporters had at least
the vague sensation they had been
snookered again by Washington.
Journalists-and therefore the US
public-were submitted to a mediamanagement intelligence operation orchestrated by the Pentagon
and the White House. These were
more concerned with molding
public opinion than with providing
information and details on what
was until the Gulf Crisis the largest
US military operation since the
Vietnam War
Psychological operations officers guided media tours of General Manuel Antonio Noriega's
offices, all too willing to reveal
cocaine seizures that ended up

PeterEisner is chief of Newsday's
Miami bureau.

being tamales and to display pornographic photos, a gun collection, and portraits of Hitler and
Quaddafi conveniently side by side.
These same officers also worked
with the Panamanian news media
when they returned to the air with
a unanimous pro-invasion stance.

Sharing the Blame
In spite of Southern Command efforts, journalists in Panama could
have waged a better campaign.
When they were finally set free
after four days, many were at first
skeptical when they saw a cheering
populace applauding the US soldiers in green. Yet with the repeated images, and few trips
organized outside the US military
domain, skepticism was suspended
in favor of stories closer at hand.
Not that it was easy. In the isolated environment created by Pentagon news management, many
reporters were concerned about
their personal safety. Some had
never before been to Panama, and
many had no idea how to go about

covering the war There was little
chance to evaluate how the war was
going. Only later did it become apparent that the US attack on
Panama was an assault on an illprepared force that could offer up
only scant and sporadic resistance.
The reporters could not know
this. They were dependent on the
Department of Defense and ripe
for the performance they were
about to hear
The press officer was a starched
colonel who in better times was the
calm voice of military confidence
at Southern Command. For the occasion, however, he was regaled in
full camouflage, complete with
holstered side arm. There was an
edge of danger in it all, and he was
the only contact with the war that
the reporters-clad in designer
jeans and Banana Republic shirtscould not see.
"Listen, I'm going to be frank
with you," he said, sweat gathering
on his upper lip and a nervous
otherworldly look in his eye. "We
have too many of you here and
your safety is our primary concern."
Clearly, in the colonel's (and by
extension, the US military's) view,
Panama was too dangerous a place
to let people out on the streets.
And if the streets were too dangerous, there was no reporting to be
done there. And if there was no
reporting to be done, then the
reporters should leave. Some of
the assembled journalists gasped in
disbelief, demanding they be set
free as soon as possible. Most
stayed, but more than 100 reporters took the colonel's advice
and left that same night on a military plane for Houston. The rest
were set free the following day.
The US did its best to deny access and complicate the lives of
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journalists. Pentagon pool reporters, in particular, complained
they spent most of their time waiting for long and meaningless trips
to places where nothing was happening. When the reporters asked
to be taken to the heaviest fighting
at Noriega's headquarters, they
were refused access. "We told our
escorts that was where we needed
to be," Fred Francis of NBC told an
interviewer "We were told, 'it was
too dangerous. " Francis got news
of the invasion on the first day by
watching a TV feed of a Pentagon
briefing from Washington.
After the fiasco of trying to
cover Grenada, where reporters
were detained and the Pentagon
otherwise blocked them from
doing their jobs, US officials said
they would fashion a policy that
would aid the public's right to
know. Contrary to that promise,
treatment of the news media in
Panama was obstructionist, ineffective, and often cranky. The invasion degenerated into a US
misinformation campaign of dutifully published stories about Noriega's red underwear, taste in rock
music, and attachment to voodoostories that later proved to be false.
Thanks to a propaganda campaign
that embarrassed even US civilian
officials, the Southern Command
reported finding 50 pounds of
cocaine in Noriega's offices. Six
weeks later, they admitted a slight
mistake: there had been no cocaine, just tamales. It was, the Pentagon said, "an honest mistake."
In the feeding frenzy for stories
about Noriega's exile and his
reported vices, US journalists compounded the insult of being invited
to go home, by not venturing far
beyond the range of the US government's public relations managers.
Few reporters looked beyond the
altered appearance of a country
under occupation to the more
complex realities. The TV images
showed cheering middle-class residents embracing the US troops.
Nevertheless, many Panamanians were out of the spotlight but
in the war zone. Impoverished and
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confused, these people described
themselves as patriots-bona fide
opponents of both Noriega and
the US invasion. Hundreds who suffered the consequences of the US
blitz were-and still are-almost
totally ignored. They were the
anonymous victims of a war that
US officials said ended with little
"collateral damage." The reality
was often cruelly different.

ItWon't Get Easier ...
In the 1990s reporters will likely
face growing impediments to the
open exercise of their jobs. Some
of the impediments will come from
the government, but some will be
of their own making.
At stake is the balance between
gaining access to the news and
making use of it to the fullest extent possible. The danger is that
journalists simply lose interest in
the broader questions of the day in
the rush to get the story back home.
Are journalists incapable of
identifying more than one social
group? Have they lost the ability to
hear other viewpoints without
deciding that these represent an
unreasonably small minority? Journalists have the responsibility to
search out the cultural diversity of
the stories and countries they cover
The lesson of Panama was not
lost on the media managers at the
White House, whose tactics were
rewarded with a high media rating
for President George Bush. Hot
after Panama, they warned the
White House press they could not
guarantee the safety of reporters
covering the February Cartagena
drug summit. Reporters were
bivouacked instead in the city of
Barranquilla so that Bush, playing
the conquering hero, could stop
off for a news conference after the
fact. The image produced by the
trend-setting Washington press
corps ensured a subordinate slot
for the other voices in Cartagenawhere Colombian, Peruvian, and
Bolivian officials argued against US
economic pressure and military
adventurism.

The prospect is one of US officials serving up journalistic pablum
to reporters in a safe, comfortable
location, while advising that alternative viewpoints will be both expensive and dangerous to obtain. This
scenario plays to the growing tendency of news reporting to provide
that which is clearly at hand, instead of breaking ground on that
which is further off. The result is a
distortion that feeds the imagemaking capabilities of the TV pictures transmitted back home. To
this hour, most Americans think
that the Panama invasion was a
"clean, surgical operation," to use
Pentagon phrasing, and that Panamanians cheered the US onslaught
in unison.
There is, however, reporting
and witnesses that show that the
US invasion was not as smooth or
clean as all that. And ironically
enough, some of the best documentation for that other vision is classified material-filmed and then
censored by the Bush administration itself. "Those classified but unforgettable moments of Operation
Just Cause were also a triumph for
photographic technology," wrote
PatrickJ Sloyan, a Newsday Washington correspondent. "The pitchblack night of the 1 A.M. H-hour
over Panama was transformed into
daylight by electronically-enhanced
infrared military cameras. Air
Force, Navy and Army combat
photographers recorded-from
above and below-some of the
4,500 US paratroopers who took a
17-second plunge into combat
from only 500-feet. The same infrared technique was used to record
sound and sight of the massive firefight at the Commandancia, the
Panamanian Defense Force headquarters in the crowded slums of
Panama City" (January 14, 1990)
"It is really dramatic stuff," said
an Army official who viewed the
combat photography. But that
footage, along with the penultimate moment when Noriega surrendered at the Vatican Embassy
before Army video cameras, are
not for taxpayer consumption.

"Combat photography is for combat use-internal use," said Robert
Hall, an aide to Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney. To a reporter's demand for films of combat and
Noriega's surrender, Hall advised
legal action against the Defense
Department. "File a freedom-ofinformation suit."
To be sure, access to the news is
a more complicated notion than
arriving at the scene. Anyone with
plane fare can gain access to the
far reaches of news events in a
short amount of time, unless some
government puts up systematic
roadblocks.
Yet access also involves the tools
employed, familiarity and sensitivity to culture, a knowledge of
background history, and the ability
to break away from the pack. And
it involves having editors back
home who believe in the independence ofjournalistic inquiry instead
of packaged recapitulation of the
resident wisdom gleaned from
Washington and the nightly news.
Reporters could have made better use of their belated access by
covering important stories ignored
by most news outlets. A different
notion of news access would have
identified other voices: the Panamanian who took up a gun and shot
US soldiers to defend his notion of
patriotism and homeland; the grieving wife who braved the smell of
death at the overflowing city
morgue to identify her husband--a
traffic cop shot in the back by advancing US soldiers; and the lawyer
who was dragged from his home at
random to be interrogated by US
troops about his political beliefs.
"Was catching Noriega worth
so much death?" asked an impoverished construction worker, after he
told a US reporter he supported
the invasion. He was confused, he
said. He hated Noriega, but capturing the general was not worth so
much bloodshed.
And what about the death of
so many people? Was Panama an
anonymous land, where the invasion's dead are anonymous souls
comprising a questionable body

count? US cultural prejudice gave
all importance to 23 US soldiers
and almost none to the untold
hundreds of Panamanians who lie
in common graves. No one knows
how many Panamanians died and
under what circumstances those
deaths took place. Because of a collapsed system of gathering and reporting death statistics, we may
never know whether the official
death toll among Panamanians of
516 civilian and military deaths is
at all accurate.
For a journalist, should a Panamanian's life be worth any less
than that of a GI? One could argue
about the concerns of the folks
back home, but for a reporter, beholden to the truth, can patriotism
get in the way? It seems incredible,
but in 1990 the cynical Fleet Street
wisdom that "one dead Englishman is worth a thousand dead Pakistanis" is still frighteningly true.
And while many Americans were
deluged with information about
the 23 US servicemen reported
dead, the US military has not been
held to task about their deaths
either Where did they die, under
what conditions? Were any of the
deaths, as in the case of Grenada,
the result of friendly fire? As with
much of the coverage of Panama,
little was done by journalists to put
those numbers to the test. There
were considerable restrictions on
reporting, and there was lack of accountability by the US government,
but there was also limited interest
on the part of many reporters in
going beyond the most obvious
stories. US military opinion shapers
took advantage of this the same
way the White House press office
does everyday, by proffering the
diverting news story.
They succeeded. The residing
perception of the Panama invasion
is not of troops slogging through
the mud or dying on some foreign
battlefield, but long after the
action was over smiling soldiers
being hugged by middle-class supporters in downtown Panama City
and blasting loud music at the
demonized Panamanian dictator

If human lives are important, if
Colombia and Panama and Peru
have just as much right to their national aspirations as the US does,
then US journalists may be doing
an abysmal job of covering the
news.

Facing the '90s
Journalism in the 1990s has some
serious questions to ask about its
role in covering government. And
one of the greatest false assumptions that news reporters of the
1990s will ever make is that the
government is telling them the
truth.
Instead the news media gets
caught up in the simple story of an
American fight in which there were
American casualties for a vaguely
defined cause. And then, after
some wringing of hands, the
camera turns toward another
event, and collective memory dissolves. We compound the error by
letting the stories drop off the
radar scope as soon as Washington
casts a benign and neglectful look
askance.
The news machine is plowing
other fields right now, be it South
Africa, the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf, or the democratic opening in Eastern Europe. The stories
of war dead and destruction in
Panama are barely a whisper heard
on the journalistic horizon.
The US game plan in Panama
was based on secrecy and silence.
The government, reveling in the
high approval rating garnered for
President Bush, languishes in the
notion that it went like clockwork,
the deception and lies justified by
having accomplished the goal of
capturing a renegade former
employee.
All in all, the image is one of
journalistic future shock. And if
the US press is not careful, Panama
is the harbinger of a relationship
that will systematically convert
reporting from its watchdog role
into a subservient handmaiden of
a manipulative, nonresponsive
government. *
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1992: The EC and the Caribbean
by Paul Sutton

mark the 500th anniversary of
its
discovery
by Europe.will
In
n 1992
the Caribbean
Europe 1992 will mark a different, but equally important
event. By the end of that year,
the European Community (EC)
will have transformed itself into a
single market of 320 million people accounting for 20% of world
trade. This event will have profound implications for the Third
World, which represents about onethird of EC imports and exports.
For the Caribbean in particular,
the implications are of major significance given the longevity of its
ties with Europe and the importance of trade with the EC to its
social and material well-being.
This transformation will be consequential for a select number of
commodities of major importance
to the Caribbean Common Market
(CARICOM) Among these commodities are sugar, bananas, and
rum in agriculture; and alumina,
bauxite, refined petroleum, and
petroleum products in minerals.
Singly or in combination these account for 80% or more of exports
to the EC for nine of CARICOM's
13 member states, while for several

Paul Sutton is a lecturer in politics at
the University of Hull, England.He is
the editor of Europe and the Caribbean (London. MacMillan, 1991).
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others they are the main source of
foreign exchange and providers of
employment.

1992 as a Threat
The year 1992 poses its most acute
threat to bananas. Under present
arrangements, banana imports

from the CARICOM countries and
the French dpartementsenjoy
preferential access to the British
and French markets respectively.
In effect, a complex series of licensing and tariff arrangements maintains a market for high-cost
Caribbean producers to the disadvantage of lower-cost producers
in Colombia, Ecuador, and Central
America. Since one of the principles of the EC's unified market is
the free movement of goods between member countries, these
preferential trading arrangements
cannot survive 1992. For instance,
bananas imported into any one EC
country can be freely circulated in
another The European consumer
will benefit from the unrestricted
entry of low-cost Latin American
bananas throughout the EC. In
direct contrast, the high-cost
peasant producer in the Eastern
Caribbean, working difficult terrain in small plots, will lose out in
the resulting competition. It has
even been suggested that the Caribbean producer may have to entirely cease production for export.

Understandably, such a prospect
has caused alarm in the Caribbean
and acute concern in Brussels, London, and Paris. No solution in sight
can satisfy all parties. The British
government, for example, has yet
to articulate a position concerning
the EC's possible Caribbean impact. Neither has the Inter-Service
Group, which was set up in the
European Commission in Brussels
to review the matter and make
proposals. The preferential arrangements set out in the L6me
Conventions will continue unchanged. Yet the EC now reserves
the right to "establish common
rules for bananas" so long as no
traditional Caribbean supplier "is
placed as regards access to, and advantages in, the Community, in a
less favourable situation than in
the past or present." The Eastern
Caribbean has therefore won a temporary reprieve, but it has won no
guaranteed long-term concession
sufficient to attract substantial new
investment in the industry. At best,
the future for banana exports to
the EC is uncertain.
Beyond bananas, a number of
general threats can be identified.
The most important are trade diversion and investment diversion. The
European Commission argues that
1992 will stimulate economic
growth, resulting in a rise of EC
imports by as much as 7%. Even if
this figure is attained (and there is

a good deal of dispute among the
experts), the Caribbean is in a
poor position to capture the
benefits. Demand for most of the
region's traditional exports is
either stagnant or declining. And
although there has been an easing
of the rules of origin in the next
L6me Convention, the value added
necessary for a manufactured or
processed product to benefit from
duty-free access is still high (a minimum of 45%) and is defined by a
complex set of rules and lists.
Moreover, imports into the EC will
have to meet higher technical standards and satisfy more stringent
safety rules as the consequence of a
harmonization of consumer protection legislation within the EC.
Small-scale Caribbean producers,
then, are at a distinct disadvantage,
since they face both the mountain
of EC bureaucracy and demand for
ever more sophisticated products
that exceed the local industry's
capacity. Indeed, some CARICOM
countries may even see an erosion

o

,

tities that may be imported free of
customs duties and plans for the
abolition of the tariff quota in
1995. Increased sales in the EC will
almost certainly follow.
The greatest benefits, however,
are expected in services. In selling

the idea of 1992 to CARICOM,
European Commission officials
have stressed the opportunities
available in the travel, telecommunications, and informationprocessing industries. But above
all they have stressed tourism. In
fact, the Caribbean has an opportunity it cannot afford to miss. In
recent years the EC has accounted
for 10% of tourist arrivals and 25%
of tourist revenue in the Caribbean. The reasoning goes that
European tourists, with more
wealth and leisure as a consequence of 1992, will visit in
larger numbers and stay longer
Decreased air fares, a predicted
result of competition and deregulation, will also boost tourism.

The EC has already set aside considerable funds from its aid program to the region for tourist
development. In addition it has
urged joint ventures with European tourist operators and the
development of a coordinated
regional tourist strategy. For its
part the Caribbean has begun to
respond positively to this challenge. A Caribbean hotel registration system, promotional offices in
the EC, and market intelligence
facilities have been established. But
this new market strategy can only
be seen as a beginning, not as sufficient in itself. Foreign competition

in the EC for a quality product and
new destinations will be intensewith Eastern Europe and Southeast
Asia as especially keen rivals.

1992 as a Catalyst
As with so much of its relationship
with Europe over the last 500 years,
the predicted effects of 1992 on
the Caribbean are rather mixed.
On the negative side, 1992 constitutes both a threat to the longestablished trade in several
commodities and yet another barrier to developing newer trade in
manufactured and processed
products. On the positive side, it
provides new opportunities in the
fast-growing service industries and,
through the L6me Convention, the
guarantee of a significant amount
of financial and technical assistance. The balance between profit
and loss is narrow, but it is generally perceived as favorable from the
Caribbean side. Why else would
Haiti and the Dominican Republic
seek closer links with the EC? And
why would the CARICOM states
and Suriname continue their
membership in L6me as well as
their expensive diplomatic missions in Brussels were it not for the
real advantages derived from the
EC link?
Where, then, does the Caribbean go from here in its relations
with the EC? Signs point in one
direction. to closer intra-Caribbean
cooperation. In a world of increasingly competitive trade blocs the
Caribbean has no other choice.
Going it alone is no longer a viable
option. A deepening of integration
within CARICOM and a widening
of membership to include Suriname, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic are therefore necessities.
It is even possible to envisage the
link with the EC opening the way
to the incorporation of Cuba and
Puerto Rico at the margin. Europe,
which for centuries divided the
Caribbean, is now acting as the
catalyst to bring it together The
onus now lies with the Caribbean
to turn this promise into reality a
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1992: The EC and the Caribbean
by Paul Sutton

mark the 500th anniversary of
its
discovery
by Europe.
In
n 1992
the Caribbean
will
Europe 1992 will mark a different, but equally important
event. By the end of that year,
the European Community (EC)
will have transformed itself into a
single market of 320 million people accounting for 20% of world
trade. This event will have profound implications for the Third
World, which represents about onethird of EC imports and exports.
For the Caribbean in particular,
the implications are of major significance given the longevity of its
ties with Europe and the importance of trade with the EC to its
social and material well-being.
This transformation will be consequential for a select number of
commodities of major importance
to the Caribbean Common Market
(CARICOM) Among these commodities are sugar, bananas, and
rum in agriculture; and alumina,
bauxite, refined petroleum, and
petroleum products in minerals.
Singly or in combination these account for 80% or more of exports
to the EC for nine of CARICOM's
13 member states, while for several

Paul Sutton is a lecturer in politics at
the University of Hull, England. He is
the editor ofEurope and the Caribbean (London. MacMillan, 1991).
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others they are the main source of
foreign exchange and providers of
employment.

Understandably, such a prospect
has caused alarm in the Caribbean

and acute concern in Brussels, London, and Paris. No solution in sight

1992 as a Threat
The year 1992 poses its most acute
threat to bananas. Under present
arrangements, banana imports
from the CARICOM countries and
the French dipartementsenjoy
preferential access to the British
and French markets respectively.
In effect, a complex series of licensing and tariff arrangements maintains a market for high-cost
Caribbean producers to the disadvantage of lower-cost producers
in Colombia, Ecuador, and Central
America. Since one of the principles of the EC's unified market is
the free movement of goods between member countries, these
preferential trading arrangements
cannot survive 1992. For instance,
bananas imported into any one EC
country can be freely circulated in
another The European consumer
will benefit from the unrestricted
entry of low-cost Latin American
bananas throughout the EC. In
direct contrast, the high-cost
peasant producer in the Eastern
Caribbean, working difficult terrain in small plots, will lose out in
the resulting competition. It has
even been suggested that the Caribbean producer may have to entirely cease production for export.

can satisfy all parties. The British
government, for example, has yet
to articulate a position concerning
the EC's possible Caribbean impact. Neither has the Inter-Service

'he most important are trade diversion and investment diversion. The
European Commission argues that
1992 will stimulate economic
growth, resulting in a rise of EC
imports by as much as 7%. Even if
this figure is attained (and there is

a good deal of dispute among the
experts), the Caribbean is in a
poor position to capture the
benefits. Demand for most of the
region's traditional exports is
either stagnant or declining. And
although there has been an easing
of the rules of origin in the next
L6me Convention, the value added
necessary for a manufactured or
processed product to benefit from
duty-free access is still high (a minimum of 45%) and is defined by a
complex set of rules and lists.
Moreover, imports into the EC will
have to meet higher technical standards and satisfy more stringent
safety rules as the consequence of a
harmonization of consumer protection legislation within the EC.
Small-scale Caribbean producers,
then, are at a distinct disadvantage,
since they face both the mountain
of EC bureaucracy and demand for
ever more sophisticated products
that exceed the local industry's
capacity. Indeed, some CARICOM
countries may even see an erosion
of the few advances of recent years
as investment decisions anticipate
the greatest gains to be made from
trade within the EC or with Eastern
Europe. The continuing economic
marginalization of the Caribbean
to the EC is thus a distinct probability.

the idea of 1992 to CARICOM,
European Commission officials
have stressed the opportunities
available in the travel, telecommunications, and informationprocessing industries. But above
all they have stressed tourism. In
fact, the Caribbean has an opportunity it cannot afford to miss. In
recent years the EC has accounted
for 10% of tourist arrivals and 25%
of tourist revenue in the Caribbean. The reasoning goes that
European tourists, with more
wealth and leisure as a consequence of 1992, will visit in
larger numbers and stay longer
Decreased air fares, a predicted
result of competition and deregulation, will also boost tourism.

1992 as an Opportunity
The CARICOM countries stand to
lose from 1992, but not entirely.
First of all, the harmonization of
very different rates of excise taxes
on products such as cocoa and coffee are expected to boost demand
and price within the EC. Some
Caribbean countries stand to gain
from this change as they do as well
from modifications to the rum
protocol in the next L6mb Convention. The latter augments the quantities that may be imported free of
customs duties and plans for the
abolition of the tariff quota in
1995. Increased sales in the EC will
almost certainly follow.
The greatest benefits, however,
are expected in services. In selling

The EC has already set aside considerable funds from its aid program to the region for tourist
development. In addition it has
urged joint ventures with European tourist operators and the
development of a coordinated
regional tourist strategy. For its
part the Caribbean has begun to
respond positively to this challenge. A Caribbean hotel registration system, promotional offices in
the EC, and market intelligence
facilities have been established. But
this new market strategy can only
be seen as a beginning, not as sufficient in itself. Foreign competition

in the EC for a quality product and
new destinations will be intensewith Eastern Europe and Southeast
Asia as especially keen rivals.

1992 as a Catalyst
As with so much of its relationship
with Europe over the last 500 years,
the predicted effects of 1992 on
the Caribbean are rather mixed.
On the negative side, 1992 constitutes both a threat to the longestablished trade in several
commodities and yet another barrier to developing newer trade in
manufactured and processed
products. On the positive side, it
provides new opportunities in the
fast-growing service industries and,
through the L6me Convention, the
guarantee of a significant amount
of financial and technical assistance. The balance between profit
and loss is narrow, but it is generally perceived as favorable from the
Caribbean side. Why else would
Haiti and the Dominican Republic
seek closer links with the EC? And
why would the CARICOM states
and Suriname continue their
membership in L6me as well as
their expensive diplomatic missions in Brussels were it not for the
real advantages derived from the
EC link?
Where, then, does the Caribbean go from here in its relations
with the EC? Signs point in one
direction: to closer intra-Caribbean
cooperation. In a world of increasingly competitive trade blocs the
Caribbean has no other choice.
Going it alone is no longer a viable
option. A deepening of integration
within CARICOM and a widening
of membership to include Suriname, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic are therefore necessities.
It is even possible to envisage the
link with the EC opening the way
to the incorporation of Cuba and
Puerto Rico at the margin. Europe,
which for centuries divided the
Caribbean, is now acting as the
catalyst to bring it together The
onus now lies with the Caribbean
to turn this promise into reality. .
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The View from the Caribbean
by Anthony P Gonzalez

world economic and
geopolitical order poses
urgent challenges to
the countries of the
Caribbean. The new
situation is one of intensifying
competition for capital and markets, based on rapid innovation in
the technology and organization of
communication, production, and
transportation. It is also one of
shifting geopolitical strategies and
alignments, as economic transformations undercut the arms race of
old. These trends mean weakened
demand for the traditional exports
of the Caribbean and weakened
commitment by its traditional allies. Clearly the region stands at
the crossroads of its economic and
diplomatic future. What are the
implications for Caribbean trade
policy?

of the US will remain a zone of
transnational drug trafficking, illegal immigration, fiscal erosion,
worsening poverty, environmental
deterioration, and fragile democracies, but the impact of these
trends will continue to be felt not
only in the Caribbean but in the
US as well. It is doubtful, nonetheless, that the magnitude of Washington's security response will

Crumbling Pillars
At the core of the Caribbean's
challenges is the crumbling of its
three geostrategic pillars: the Cold
War, Third World solidarity, and
traditional European market protection. To begin with, the end of
the Cold War implies that the
Caribbean is of reduced strategic
importance in East-West terms and
that US development assistance to
the region will drop substantially.
Undoubtedly the southern flank
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approximate that of the past, as
indicated by its modest response to
Latin American and Caribbean appeals for aid in fighting the drug
war Yet debate within the US is
open-ended inasmuch as US
foreign policy is undergoing
profound revision in the postCold War climate.
Since achieving independence
in the 1960s, Caribbean countries
have been active in Third World
efforts to redress North-South
economic imbalances. For more
than a decade, however, Third
World solidarity has been on the
wane, symbolized by the disunity
regarding the Uruguay Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. The key reason is the
growing differentiation of Third

World countries in terms of their
levels of development and relations
with the world economy. This process is bound to accelerate with the
formation of regional trade blocs,
which will stimulate economic
transformation in those Third
World countries that gain entry at
the relative expense of those that
are left outside.
In a multipolar world, the most
powerful states will be assuming
greater responsibilities within their
home regions while disengaging
themselves from other regions.
This tendency will make it more
difficult for Third World countries
to hold a few metropolitan powers
accountable for the plight of the
periphery. Such ambiguity will become especially pronounced as
within each trade bloc the metropolitan powers come to share
influence with ascending intermediate powers (e.g., Brazil and
Mexico in Latin America) The
emergence of such divisions within
and outside the Third World will
likely undercut its diplomatic
raison d'8tre, in part by pulling the
rug out from under its nonaligned
movement.
Finally, the L6m6 IV Convention of December 1989 bore testimony to the erosion of traditional
European commitments to protect
the export markets of principle
Caribbean commodities such as
sugar and bananas. The European
Community (EC) failed to offer export guarantees to the Caribbean
against the impact of the Uruguay
Round. Nor did it offer to safeguard Caribbean export guarantees from the impact of Europe's
market unification of 1992. The
Caribbean's trade privileges with
Europe are vanishing as the EC
seeks to globalize its commercial

ties with the developing world and
establish a special trade relationship with Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean.

Trade Options
Given these trends, it is clear that
the Caribbean must bolster its
world-market competitiveness-the
standards for which are sharply
rising. The consensus seems to be
that doing so must begin with
domestic and regional policies to
raise productivity. The corresponding approach to trade policy,
however, is the subject of considerable debate that centers on five
perspectives.
The first perspective claims that,
both as individual countries and
through the regional vehicle of the
Caribbean Common Market
(CARICOM), the Caribbean already possesses all the access to international markets it needs. Such
access is based on L6me, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and
the Caribbean-Canadian Trade
Agreement (CARIBCAN) From
this viewpoint, the problem is how
to exploit the accessible markets by
focusing on product niches. Unfortunately, though, market access
under these schemes is largely illusory. The reason is that they
restrict and exclude many Caribbean products, particularly in the
most vital market: the US. In addition, protectionism, especially
under CBI, has impeded the flow
of export-oriented capital to the
shores of the Caribbean. CBI did
foster the expansion of a few nontraditional exports, such as apparel, electronics, fruits, and winter
vegetables, but the region's anticipated export take-off did not occur, due mainly to the insecure
foreign-market access of many of
its products.
According to a second perspective, CARICOM needs to establish
a common regional tariff and a
single market for the region's
producers. Yet this argument assumes CARICOM could negotiate
access to export markets without

getting entangled in reciprocal
trade agreements. Given the
likelihood of such entanglements,
it is unclear what CARICOM would
have to concede in exchange for
guaranteed market access. The argument also overlooks the limitations on the development of large
specialized firms imposed by
CARICOM's small market size.
A third perspective proposes the
widening of CARICOM to include
some subset of additional countries
in the Caribbean Basin, especially
the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
and Suriname. This approach
would scarcely solve the problem
of market size or reduce dependence on extraregional markets.
Nevertheless, it could be useful in
strengthening the Caribbean's collective negotiating leverage.
A fourth perspective stresses the
importance of North-South cooperation, particularly with Latin
America. Yet this option continues
to be frustrated by the economic
plight of the South, whose revival
hinges substantially on the policies
of the North. Furthermore, economic cooperation and integration
with South America have always
been inhibited by the Caribbean's
special arrangements with the
North. Insofar as these arrangements are dissolving, scope is
broadened for links with Latin
America. Still, significantly
strengthened links with Latin
America cannot occur until it undergoes substantial economic
recovery.
From the standpoint of a fifth
perspective, the Caribbean needs
to forge ties with the Far East. Such
ties could indeed be fruitful as
sources of capital and tourism. It is
doubtful, however, that the Caribbean could be a successful exporter to Asia, a possibility that lies
well beyond the immediate objective of becoming a regionally competitive exporter

ACaribbean Megabloc
The restructuring of the world
economy is articulating a new

spatial system of production in
which export manufacturing based
on cheap, unskilled labor is fast
receding. This trend is facilitated
by telecommunications that permit
the integration of management
with technology transfer; that is,
management operations can stay at
home as production activities become divided among various locales worldwide. In this setting,
transnational firms increasingly locate their production activities on
the basis of access to large protected markets. As a consequence,
the ability of Third World zones to
create or attach themselves to market blocs is essential in their competitive quest to attract capital.
The locational attraction is enhanced by the possession of skilled
labor at a reasonable cost.
An example of the logic of
megablocs is Canada's free-trade
agreement with the US. Canadian
policymakers came to realize that
the inflow of foreign investment is
linked to access to a large protected market. They decided that,
while a free-trade agreement would
give US investors a decided edge in
Canada's service, financial, and
agricultural sectors, it would also
enhance Canada's competitive
edge in its key spheres of manufacturing, such as steel and
automobile parts. Canadian
policymakers, then, are prepared
to lose some degree of ownership
and control of certain economic
sectors in exchange for a benefit:
improved access to the US market
for other economic sectors that
are internationally competitive and
where gains are associated with returns to scale. Hence, Canada's
free-trade decision is based on the
security of access to the US market.
The Caribbean's interests are
similar to Canada's, especially
given the region's apprehension
about the possible impact of a USMexico free-trade agreement,
which threatens to marginalize the
Caribbean from transnational flows
of capital and commerce. Still,
while the Caribbean has demonstrated substantial interest in join-

Hemisphere Fall 1990

27

Features: The Caribbean

ing such a megabloc, it is unclear
whether Canada and Mexico would
favor extending a free-trade agreement further south. President
George Bush's Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, however, would
create such an extension.
Whatever the obstacles, there
are compelling reasons why a freetrade agreement should include
the Caribbean and South America
as well. First, the US needs to invite
international competition in order
to improve its productivity, and,
in the face of other protected
megablocs, regional competition
would be an obvious alternative.
Second, insofar as massive populations will become engulfed by
megablocs in Europe and the
Pacific Rim, the Americas need to
form a protected hemispheric
market. Third, the US has a stake
in picking up the economic pieces
in Latin America and the Caribbean as a means of building a
prosperous zone of interdependent trade.

Challenges for Diplomacy
What, then, are the prospects for
Caribbean trade? They are favorable if Caribbean leaders confront
head-on the ramifications of the
new global economic order for
trade diplomacy. Since achieving
independence in the 1960s, the
Caribbean has pursued a course of
trade diplomacy based on "nonreciprocity" between developed
and developing countries. This
principle of favored treatment for
Caribbean trade is reflected in the
General System of Preferences,
L6m6, CBI, and CARIBCAN. Yet
the moment has arrived to raise
questions concerning the supposed
advantages of nonreciprocity.
Recognition of the dim future of
nonreciprocal, privileged trade arrangements has caused many lessdeveloped countries to seek some
form of reciprocal bargaining.
Such countries are liberalizing
their import policies under structural adjustment programs in order
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to increase their access to export
markets. In view of the Caribbean's
small size and limited development, reciprocal bargaining should
be handled with caution. It should
proceed piecemeal, carefully considering the timing of negotiations
and the economic sectors to be
included. Nonetheless, caution
should not be carried too far- the
key is not to lose the benefits of
belonging to a free-trade scheme.
The most important ingredient
may be a regional platform of negotiations. Such a platform is absent
under CBI-one reason for the
policy's failure. A regional platform should be structured so that
it enhances the Caribbean's collective bargaining power In any case,
negotiations must go hand-in-hand
with a strategy of achieving economic competitiveness in potential
fields of regional strength. External financial and technical assistance must be part of the package.
The Caribbean's traditional
concepts of sovereignty and independence are facing basic challenges. The region might well be
inclined to view reciprocal negotiations as a threat to its autonomy.
This was precisely the response of
the Central American Common
Market to the recommendation by
the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean
that it enter into a free-trade bloc
with the US. Yet, if the Caribbean
proves unable to secure a foothold
in a restructured world order, the
long-range consequences for the
region's development could be
disastrous.
Inasmuch as the success of a
free-trade agreement depends on
the concessions negotiated, Caribbean diplomats must secure the
support of those US interests that
stand to gain from such an agreement. On this score there is room
for cautious optimism. Past bargaining and negotiating successes indicate a respectable Caribbean
capacity for diplomacy, and thus
for renegotiating the Caribbean's
position in the changing world
order .

A CBI Report Card
by Carmen Diana Deere

exports as beneficial to a country's economy as a dollar's
worth of sugar exports? The
experience of many countries
s a dollar's
worth of garment
under
the Caribbean
Basin
Initiative (CBI) suggests not. Since
the 1984 enactment of CBI, some
Caribbean Basin countries have
indeed experienced rapid export
growth and significant export diversification. Yet most of the region's
countries have not made such advances; and of those that have,
export growth and diversification
have failed to generate substantial
per capita growth of their economies. Why has CBI yielded such
disappointing results?

islands of the Eastern Caribbeanhave seen spectacular upturns in
their exports to the US.

An Assessment
In 1984-89 Caribbean Basin exports to the US fell, due largely to
a sharp drop in petroleum exports
to the US. If petroleum-exporting
countries are excluded, the region's exports to the US registered
a modest 4.1% annual increase.
This increase, however, was just
half the growth rate of world exports to the US; thus, in spite of
CBI, the Caribbean Basin became
proportionately less important
among the world's exporters to the
US. To be sure, the export performance of CBI beneficiary countries
has been quite varied. Some of the
region's countries-Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic,Jamaica, and

CarmenDianaDeere is professorof
economics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. She is co-authorof
In the Shadows of the Sun: Caribbean Development Alternatives
and U.S. Policy (PACCA/Westview,
1990).

More significant than export
growth has been the extent of export diversification. Regarding the
latter, in 1983-89 manufacturing
leaped, while mining plunged, as
percentages of Caribbean Basin
exports to the US. Manufacturing
exports surged in absolute as well
as relative terms, led by garmentsa rubric excluded from duty-free
treatment under CBI's supporting
trade legislation, the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act
(CBERA)
Can the modest rise in the
area's nonpetroleum exports to
the US and the more pronounced
diversification of its exports be attributed to CBI? The answer is no.
In 1984-89 Caribbean Basin exports subject to duty-free treatment

under CBI doubled (from 6.7% to
13.6%) as a share of the area's total
exports to the US. Nonetheless,
considering only those items that
would not otherwise have entered
the US duty-free, such exports actually dropped (from 5.9% to
5.0%) as a share of the total. In
other words, CBI's duty-free provisions have had a negligible impact
on the composition of Caribbean
Basin exports to the US.
Still, the promotional activities
of the US Department of Commerce deserve some of the credit
for the expansion of the region's
manufacturing exports. The reason
is that such activities have raised
the Caribbean Basin's economic
profile. This raised profile, in turn,
has encouraged new investment in
the region, particularly in its freetrade zones.
Yet the fundamental question
remains: has the growth of nontraditional exports contributed to
economic recovery in the region?
Again, the answer is no. The InterAmerican Development Bank reports that most of the Caribbean
Basin's economies performed
somewhat better during the CBI
years than during the early 1980s.
Their recovery, however, has been
paltry and uneven. In 1984-89 GDP
per capita dropped in El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, and Trinidad
and Tobago. Meanwhile GDP per
capita grew just minimally (0.3% to
1.3% per year) in successful exporting countries such as Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, and
Jamaica. Possibly most striking of
all is that the only country in the
region to experience robust growth
in GDP per capita was Barbados:
the very economy whose exports to

the US fell most rapidly in the CBI
period.
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The Missing Linkages
Of course, economic stagnation
or decline can be variously attributed to political turmoil, the price
of oil, the debt crisis, and austerity
programs. Why, though, have even
brilliant export performances been
associated with so little economic
growth?
The key factor is the composition of nontraditional exports. The
potential impact of an export commodity on national economic
growth essentially depends on how
much value-added it generates
domestically through two channels:
first, "backward linkages," or business demand for local raw materials and other locally produced
inputs such as services and manufactured goods; and second, "forward linkages," or worker demand
for locally produced services and
goods.
Export commodities that rely on
imported inputs and capital goods
have very low value-added content.
In contrast, those that are produced with local raw materials and
other local inputs have high valueadded content, and hence promote greater investment and
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employment in domestic industries. Similarly, if the valueadded content of an export
product consists solely of labor
costs, and if wages are extremely
low, then even expanding employment leads to minimal workerbased demand for services and
goods produced by domestic industries. Thus economies that compete internationally on the basis of
low wages-such as the economies
of the Caribbean Basin-do little
to spark the development of local
businesses.
In sum, production based on
the combination of imported inputs and low wages cannot foster
significant growth and development in national economies. Unfortunately this combination is
encouraged by CBI policy.
For instance, among the fastest
growing exports of the Caribbean
Basin are those that enter the US
under Tariff Code Items 806.3
and 807 (now HTS subheadings
9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80) These
provisions allow partial duty-free
treatment of products consisting of
US-made components that are assembled overseas or of US metal
products that are assembled

and/or processed overseas and
returned to the US for additional
processing. In 1985-89 such exports doubled (from 12% to 24%)
as a share of total Caribbean Basin
exports to the US. The problem,
however, is that these products
have low value-added content; less
than one-third of the final value of
exports corresponds to local valueadded. As a result they contribute
minimally to the region's economic growth and development.
Exemplifying this problem is the
Dominican Republic. The country
ranks as the Caribbean Basin's
largest exporter of 806-807 products to the US, and has undergone
impressive export growth under
CBI. Nevertheless, the country's
GDP per capita has remained stagnant, since the new export products are characterized by low
value-added and are inefficient
generators of foreign exchange.
The 1980-88 value of the Dominican Republic's free-trade exports
surged nearly fivefold, while the
value of such exports captured by
the Central Bank as foreign exchange-what corresponds to
domestic value-added-plummeted by nearly half.

_

This evidence suggests that even
a major rise in the free-trade export of assembled goods may not
compensate for the loss of foreign
exchange from traditional exports
such as sugar, as has occurred in
the Dominican Republic. Estimates
rate the value-added component of
traditional exports at about 90%
but that of garments assembled
from US-made and cut cloth at
about 25%. So, to maintain the
same level of value-added content
and to generate the same level of
net foreign exchange, a $1-million
drop in the Dominican Republic's
sugar exports would require a $3.6million rise in garment exports.
The growth of free-trade zones
in the Dominican Republic has
meant thousands of new jobs, especially for young women. Yet wages
are extremely low-often barely
covering the basic food basket of
workers and their families. With
such a high portion of wages spent
on food, employment in free-trade
zones creates marginal forward linkages with the rest of the economy.
Most assembly plants throughout the Caribbean Basin are lowcost investments, with minimal
capital and job-training requirements. A consequence is that the
plants are particularly "footloose";
thus they cannot be viewed as longlasting investments or employment
sources. Consider the case of Barbados, which prior to CBI was one
of the Caribbean Basin's main exporters of manufactured products.
As free-trade zones proliferated in
the area, the major corporations
operating in Barbados closed their
electronics and garment-assembly
factories in search of cheaper
labor In 1988 semiskilled labor in
Barbados earned $2.16 an hour,
compared to $0.55 an hour for
similar labor in the Dominican
Republic. As factories closed, Barbadian exports to the US plunged.
Only the expansion of the island's
tourism industry enabled it to
withstand these difficulties.
A final consideration is that freetrade zones are anything but "free"
for the host countries. Caribbean

Basin governments must provide
the infrastructure to attract investors; as a result, substantial local
resources are diverted from urgent
social investments, such as education and health. Moreover, since
incentive schemes for free-trade
zones usually include generous tax
exemptions for new investors,
neither do these zones produce
badly needed fiscal revenues.

Consider an Alternative
The evidence indicates that the
CBI export-promotion scheme is
incapable of promoting significant
growth and development in Caribbean Basin economies. Rather
than assembly industries, the region's governments should pro-

mote new export industries with
strong domestic linkages, such as
industries that rely on local raw
materials and that are oriented to
domestic as well as export markets.
Yet Caribbean Basin governments cannot alter their approach
unless the US government revises
its own economic policy. Ironically
the August 1990 enactment of CBIII made CBERA a permanent program and granted new duty-free
status to just one category of exports: articles assembled or processed wholly from US-produced
components or ingredients. Put differently, CBI-II continues to encourage the expansion of those
industries that contribute least to
the Caribbean Basin's economic
growth and development. a
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Real-World Economics
by Lisa R. Peattie

The Informal Economy"
Studies in Advanced and Less
Developed Countries
edited by Alejandro Portes, Manuel
Castells, and Lauren A. Benton. The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
360 pp. $39.50; $16.95.

economy? A natural

question, you might
say, when encountering a book on
the topic. Alejandro
Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren A. Benton have uncovered
enough interesting research along
with enough muddled conceptualization to show that the question is
silly and deserves the many silly answers it has been getting. As Portes
and Castells put it, "The informal
economy is a common-sense notion whose moving boundaries
cannot be captured by a strict definition without closing the debate
prematurely" (p. 11)
Conceptual clarity is not everything. This "notion" has thrived
on its "moving boundaries"; generated a vast literature, much of it polemic; constituted the banner of
policy proposals; and launched the
political career of economist Hernando DeSoto, whose "otro sendero"
proposes to lead Peru from what
he characterizes as its current state
of mercantilist regulation to Adam
Smith capitalism.

Lisa R. Peattieis ProfessorEmeritus
and seniorlecturer in the Department of
UrbanStudies and Planning,Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is
the authorofPlanning: Rethinking
Ciudad Guayana (The University of
MichiganPress, 1987).
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Genesis
The idea of an "informal sector"
was first put forth by the International Labor Organization (ILO)
in the context of a study of unemployment problems in Kenya. Looking about them, ILO economists
soon realized that both regular
employment and its counterpart
problem of unemployment were

the privilege of the few, and that
most Kenyans were making a living
in a variety of small unregistered
firms and individual hustles. Christening this uncharted world of economic activity the "informal sector"
gave ILO analysts a way to talk
about it, even if they in fact knew
very little about what was actually
going on.
Before ILO did its re-naming,
the economic activities so chris-

tened did not, of course, go unnoticed. Economist W Arthur Lewis,
writing on "development with unlimited supplies of labor," saw that
the surplus worker was more likely
to be shining the visiting economist's shoes or unloading a truck
than sitting on his hands. The ILO
analysis simply recognized the possibility that low-status economic activities were not a repository of
tradition or a labor reserve for the
modern firms, but rather an active
part of the larger economy.
Latin American economic
thought has tended to combine
the basically "dualist" approach of
traditional economics with a Marxist or neo-Marxist structuralism.
Dependency theory saw the proliferation of small firms-particularly
in commerce and services-as a
pathological consequence of the
control of capitalism by the great
powers, especially the US; according to the dependistas,economic
growth in the periphery made for
the repatriation of profits to the
center, leaving the economy of the
periphery undercapitalized and
organizationally stunted. To the traditional and neo-Marxists, the "informal" economy was a symptom
of the diseased economy. More
generally they saw the contrast between "formal" and "informal" as
one aspect of the inherently uneven development of capitalism:
the entrepreneurship of "informal"
enterprises merely contributed to
super-exploitation by large firms at
the top of the system.
ILO's formulation made a
whole new set of economic activities a respectable topic for study.
The first empirical research to appear was a group of studies attempting to measure the informal sector
statistically and to develop tables

M

showing its contribution to employment and production. It soon became clear, however, that there
were problems in counting activities that by definition were unregistered and that fell within a
poorly defined category to boot.
The quantitative approach soon
gave way to qualitative studies of
particular industries or clusters of
firms, often focusing on the relationship between formal and informal activities. At this point the
identification of the "informal"
with underdevelopment began to
give way. The discovery of exploitative relationships between large
firms and their informal subcontractors in the Third World encountered a growing literature on
"informalization" as a way of economic restructuring in the US and
Europe. Meanwhile the lingering
suspicion that there might be some
development potential among the
Third World's small entrepreneurs
met the discovery of a thriving
pattern of small-firm "flexible specialization" in the Red Belt of Italy.
So, we have a fuzzy concept, a
diversity of phenomena to which it
might apply, and significant intellectual interest. Portes, Castells,
and Benton realize the thing to do
is to plunge into the phenomenal
world to which the various "informal sector" arguments refer, rather
than haggle over definitions or argue a theory of the poorly defined.
Time enough to make sense of it
all later
Let me mention that in 1973,
preparing to go to Bogota with
some Ford Foundation money to
do an exploratory study of the informal sector, I wrote a memorandum to myself called "All That
Funny Stuff." In that memorandum I promised to remember that

a concept lumping together housemaids and low-paid factory workers, or an unlicensed vendor of
shoelaces and a drug dealer with a
fleet of planes and a senator in his
pocket, could not make much
sense. Nevertheless, I told myself,
there is a world out there that gave
rise to this idea; let us collect its
stories and try to make some sense
of them. That is just what the
editors of The InformalEconomy
have tried to do.

Comparing Cases
The 15 case studies that make up
the collection cover an extraordinary range. Geographically they include Malaysia, Colombia, Italy,
Spain, Great Britain, and the US.
Informal activities in the capitalist
economies of Miami, Madrid, and
New York can be compared to informal earnings and outlays in the
Soviet Union. There are accounts

of the role of cocaine in the economy of Bolivia, how neoconservative economic strategy in Great
Britain leads to "informalization,"
and the dynamics of small firms in
Italy and Spain. Clearly there is no
such thing as "the informal sector,"
but rather a great variety of informal sectors: economic activities outside the officially sponsored or
officially regulated spheres.
The diversity of informal sectors
can extend even to a single locality.
Alex Stepick's chapter on "Miami's
Two Informal Sectors" shows how
two ethnic enclaves have developed
along sharply different lines. The
resourceful (and US-government
supported) Cuban refugees have
produced a prosperous smallbusiness sector tied to the larger
economy. Meanwhile the Haitians,
excluded from good jobs by racial
and ethnic prejudice and from US
government support by their illegal status (and prejudice), have
learned to survive at the bottom of
the system through self-employment and casual labor
The nature of the informal
economy thus depends on the specific context. According to T G.
McGee and his colleagues, "The
mix of international, national, and
microlevel processes is somewhat
different in every case" (p. 265)
The boundaries shift with the regulatory activity of the state. As Portes and his co-editors write, "What
is informal and perhaps persecuted
in one setting may be perfectly
legal in another; the same activity
may shift its relative location across
the formal-informal cleavage many
times; and, finally, the very notion
of informality may become irrelevant in those cases in which state
regulation of economic relations is
nil" (p. 298) Juan Carlos Fortuna
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and Suzana Prates observe that
the activity of the state, in turn,
reflects shifts in the international
economic order, the "level of development and the benefits achieved
in the political arena by the working class" (p. 81), and social divisions and social prejudices.
In the Soviet case, Gregory
Grossman sees the informal sector
as generated by factors such as the
ubiquitous presence of socialist
property broadly regarded as "up
for grabs," the prohibition of most
productive activity on private account, and the ineffectiveness of
formal mechanisms. Grossman
writes that the "Soviet informal sector
is not so much the fringe of
the formal economy as a complex
intertwinement with it that is at
once symbiotic and parasitic"
(p. 152) Elsewhere, informalization is seen as an employer strategy
for reducing wages in an economy
of scarcity. Regarding the Italian
"Red Belt," Vittorio Capecchi emphasizes the development of an
entrepreneurial culture and informal economy of growth within a
uniquely supportive political
climate, with communist local
governments providing technical
education and other services.

New Categories, New Strategies
Confronting these diverse and
fascinating phenomena, it seems
obvious that the definitions and discussions of "the" informal sector
miss the mark. The issue, rather, is
the emergence of a kind of realworld economics. Instead of "the
economy" there are institutions.
Instead of "industries" and "sectors" there are entrepreneurs and
firms. Instead of "labor" and "labor
markets" there are employers and
workers with particular purposes
and characteristics, all in intricate
interaction. The household appears not as merely responding to
economic conditions, but as coordinating and modulating economic
activities. Social roles constituted
by gender, age, ethnicity, citizenship, and race get built into eco-
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nomic structures. Politics fails to
take total command, even in the
socialist world, but on the other
hand, nowhere is the economy independent of politics. For instance,
tightly intertwined with politics and
the state is the thoroughly illegal
drug industry.
We have learned to ask: what
ought the state to do? What should
be its policy toward, for example,
"informal" firms? But the comparison in this volume between the
situations in Spain and in the
Italian Red Belt suggests another
sort of question: what are the interests of the state under specific conditions, and what is the state likely
to do in various situations? Will not
the centralizing state necessarily
tend to ally itself with large corporate entities and foreign investors? In this real-world economics
the national state is another actor
to be observed and understood.
Moreover, there is ample
material for discussions of labor
strategy. It is not just that "informalization" so frequently occurs as
the consequence of employer attempts to cut wages and shift responsibility for social welfare to the
worker family. There are also wider
consequences for class structure.
According to Bryan Roberts, '"The
diverse jobs held by household
members also mean that Guadalajara's low-income population is
not clearly differentiated along
class lines.
A person's job position is unlikely to remain constant
during his or her working life.
Life history and life cycle, rather
than class or formal and informal
employment, are thus the differentiating factors within Guadalajara's low-income population"

(p.54)
In such an economy, should
labor's strategy be to fight against
"informalization" and to extend
regulation and social benefits to
those now outside the formal system? Or should labor recognize, as
the editors suggest, that informalization is here to stay and that the
neo-Marxist image of proletarianization is an illusion? They also

is how to
suggest that "the task
redefine the struggle for equality
in terms other than wage levels,
working hours, and benefits attached to conventional employment.
A new Social Contract in
which governments would guarantee minimum living standards
and security to people and not as
workers, would do away with the
most socially wrenching consequences of decentralization and
informality" (p. 310)
When I was doing my exploration of informal activities in
Bogota, I saw people struggling
with these issues in the context of
their daily work, as entrepreneurs,
workers, bureaucrats, and political
organizers. Some informal firms
had been integrated into the oldline unions and parties; they were
thoroughly conservative small
businessmen. Under the organizing strategy of the "mass line," thousands of street vendors marched
against regulations intended to restrict their access to the major thoroughfares. I remember especially
my discussion with a member of
the Confederaci6nSindical de Trabajadores Colombianos (CSTC) on the
matter of the "informals." He said
that he personally did not think of
them as "lumpen"; indeed, CSTC
was sponsoring a union that would
join workers in large commercial
enterprises with street vendors. Of
course, he asserted, the "workers"
are the spinal column of the Revolution; the "informals" can simply
make a contribution. Yet he paused
for a moment and said. "But you
know, they are so much more radical. In a system like this, as soon as
someone gets a regular job, they
become so conservative.
"
In studies of the "informal
economy" we are finding not only
real-world economics but also realworld politics with all its ambiguities and unpredictabilities. The
study of real-world institutions,
ever fuzzy and fascinating, will in
the end serve as a better grounding
for action than the deceptive clarity of economic modeling and academic political theorizing. .

Strategic Choices
With Open Arms: Cuban
Migration to the United States
by Felix Roberto Massud-Piloto.
Rowman and Littlefield, 1988.
168 pp. $28.95.
F6lix Roberto Massud-Piloto has
written a compelling and unsettling history of the politics of US
immigration policies towards Cuba,
Haiti, and Central America. He explores the interplay of ideology
and geopolitics in the making of
US immigration policies, and how
that interplay unfolds in terms of
the naked pursuit of power and interests by the US and, to a lesser
extent, by a reactive Cuba.
With Open Arms emphasizes
three themes. The main theme is
that US ideological and strategic
considerations, rather than humanitarian objectives, explain its "open
arms" immigration policies towards
Cubans and restrictive policies towards Haitians and Central Americans. Thus, Massud claims that US
immigration policies towards Cuba
are linked to a strategy of undercutting the island's communist
regime by encouraging population
flight from a communist country to
a "free" country, thereby draining
it of vital human resources (such as
physicians, teachers, and technicians) By way of contrast, the author emphasizes that restrictive
immigration policies towards
Haitians and Central Americans
are due to a different strategic assessment. This assessment holds
that an "open arms" policy would
either undercut friendly governments or not significantly contribute to attaining US objectives in
Haiti and Central America. Immigration policy thus is subsumed
under the ideological and strategic
objectives of containment of communism and seemingly has no independent status as an issue in US
politics.
The second theme is that the
anticommunist ideology behind
US immigration policy has actually

undercut US interests and caused
great suffering among Cubans. Massud writes that US anticommunism
exaggerated and distorted the nature of the Cuban revolution and
caused US policymakers to overreact. This overreaction, he argues,
damaged US interests by forcing
the revolutionaries to align with
the USSR, as well as by leading to
the exodus of Cuba's opposition
elites.
The third theme of the book is
the unintended domestic political
consequences of US immigration
policies. Massud finds that the
"open arms" policy towards Cubans
and the restrictive policy towards
Haitians have exacerbated ethnic
and racial tensions in South Florida, as black leaders and Haitian migrant leaders in the US see racism
behind the divergent treatment of
predominantly white Cuban and
black Haitian refugees.
As for policy recommendations,
the author argues that Cuba and
the US share an interest in nonideological bilateral immigration
agreements. According to Massud,
Cuba needs a permanent outlet for
political and labor migration. By
the same token, the US needs to
avoid the erratic mass migrations
of the past, which exacerbate domestic ethnic and racial conflicts.
Massud proposes that the US implement hemispheric migration policy
that will ease regional foreignpolicy tensions. Furthermore, he
contends that it is possible and
essential for the US to adopt a "single, non-ideological and humanitarian standard for guaranteeing
refugee status" (p. 131)
Despite its provocative insights,
With Open Arms leaves some key issues unresolved. For example, is
the US state as monolithic in its approach to immigration policy as
the analysis suggests? The reader is
left wondering about possible contradictions within the US state and
how these affect immigration
policies. The principal weakness,
however, is Massud's seeming acceptance of the ideological framework he criticizes. His portrayal of

Cuban migration as fundamentally
responding to political events that
are largely dictated by external
political forces ignores the motives
of the refugees themselves. He
does not address variation in the
impact of US migration policy on
classes, ethnic groups, and political
sectors in Cuba. Neither does he
address what the Cuban state has
done to mediate these pressures
and how it has failed or succeeded.
Along the same lines, Massud does
not analyze how economic contradictions in Cuban socialism influence migration choices.
Nonetheless, Massud's contribution is significant. His provocative analysis could serve as a spark
for additional research on US immigration policy, as well as on USCuban relations in general.
Gast6n A. Ferndndez
St. Olaf College

Making Policy
Latin America in the
International Political System
by G. Pope Atkins. Boulder, San Francisco, and London. Westview Press,
1989. 421 pp. Paperback.$21 95.
Foremost among this volume's
many strengths is its framework for
analyzing Latin America's foreign
policy. In employing a systems perspective, the book comprehensively
examines the actors, influences,
decisionmaking processes, policies,
and relationships that shape the
role of the region in international
affairs.
To his credit, G. Pope Atkins
wisely limits obtrusive systems terminology and esoteric debate,
while refraining from deterministic
or teleological reasoning. Atkins
uses the systems approach to identify and explain tendencies-rather
than allegedly "inevitable" systemgenerated behavior and events-in
the region.
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The volume's examination of
the actors who influence Latin
America's role in international affairs includes hemispheric and nonhemispheric states, along with
nonstate actors. Its analysis of Latin
American states is particularly valuable in showing that foreign policymaking in the US is vastly different
from that process in other countries. In this respect, the book
makes the formation of Latin
American foreign policies much
less enigmatic to readers who are
accustomed to analyzing international politics from a US perspective.
Due to their limited resources
in the arena of international relations, Latin American states have
traditionally favored using international organizations as foreignpolicy instruments. In addressing
these organizations, Atkins examines various attempts at Latin American integration and association,
ranging from the 19th-century
movements for Spanish-American
union to contemporary arrangements for economic cooperation,
such as the Latin American Free
Trade Association, the Latin
American Association for Integration, the Special Latin American
Coordinating Commission, and the
Latin American Economic System.
He also includes chapters on the
inter-American system and Latin
American involvement in global
and extraregional arrangements,
such as the UN, commodity agreements, and the Nonaligned Movement.
Perhaps the most valuable
chapter is the conclusion, in which
Atkins reviews some of the major
theories of Latin American international relations. His discussion of realism, idealism, Marxism,
liberal developmentalism, and various formulations of dependency
theory, as well as of the policy implications of each perspective, is a
fitting capstone for this excellent
survey.

MartinJ.Collo
Widener University
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Revolutionary Mexico
The Mexican Revolution
in Puebla, 1908-1913: The
Maderista Movement and the
Failure of Liberal Reform
by David LaFrance. Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989.

288 pp. $35.00.
The Mexican revolution has been
the subject of regional analyses
that have explored variations in the
content and objectives of leaders
and participants. David LaFrance's
book outlines several developments in narrative form: the evolution of the Maderistaanti-reelection
movement in the state of Puebla in
1909 and 1910; the local revolutionary movement that contributed to
the fall of Porfirio Diaz in 1911; the
local-level failure of Madero's program of liberal democracy and
limited moderate reforms; and the
collapse of the Maderistamovement
in 1913. LaFrance presents the
names, dates, and some background information on the principal actors in Puebla politics

between 1909 and 1913. The study
is well documented with sources
from regional and national archives.
The book summarizes the
course of events in Puebla in a
chaotic four-year period, but the
reader may be left unsatisfied. LaFrance documents yet does not adequately explain the nature of the
revolutionary movement. He discusses the peasantry, the lower
class, radicals, and factory workers
who contributed to Diaz's removal
from power. Nonetheless, he has little concrete to say about the origins of these groups and their
objectives. For example, the successful revolutionary movement of
1911 was basically a rural insurrection involving the peasantry, either
landless or landed. LaFrance notes
several short-term factors that may
have contributed to the peasant insurrection, such as crop failure and
high agricultural prices. These factors, however, served merely to

ignite long-standing grievances
that LaFrance does not systematically explore. Thus the author says
too little about changing patterns
of land tenure and rural social relations in Puebla during the Porfiriato, which may have contributed
to the outbreak of unprecedented
rural violence in the state. Nor
does LaFrance say enough about
workers in Puebla's growing industrial sector.
One fundamental weakness of
the book is the author's failure to
place the case of Puebla within the
context of the growing literature
on the Mexican revolution, particularly the more analytical
studies. For example, LaFrance
could have benefited from a discussion of the conceptual perspectives
presented by such authors as John
Tutino and Arturo Warman to explain the origins of Puebla's rural
movement. Finally, he neither relates the findings of this study to
the general literature on the
Mexican revolution, nor says much
about the literature on the revolution in Puebla.
The book's introduction is extremely disappointing. The audience to which the book is directed
probably knows enough about Mexican history so that LaFrance did
not have to present a brief overview of its trajectory since the
period before the Spanish conquest. Yet the book would have
benefited more from a longer discussion of the revolution's origins,
the literature on the revolution,
and the social conditions in Puebla
prior to the revolution.
The Mexican Revolution in Puebla
is a sound narrative political history. What it lacks is a significant
analytical and conceptual framework. In that light, the book
should be viewed as a preliminary
study that sets up future research
on regional variation within Puebla
concerning the social origins and
social content of the revolutionary
movement.
RobertJackson
University of Miami

New from University Presses of Florida

a in the 1850s
ough the Lens of
arles DeForest Fredricks
obert M. Levine
Previously unpublished, these
photographs document a
turning point in Cuban life,
as the island was on the
verge of social, economic,
and technological modernity... .This intriguing
little album will delight
both students of Latin
American history and photography buffs."-Booklist

ruene e lanmaa, navana.

Jamaican Sayings

University of South Florida Press
Cloth $22.95

With Notes on Folklore,
Aesthetics, & Social Control
G. Llewellyn Watson
"A rich and compelling collection that will make a significant contribution to the study of Jamaican/West Indian/
black folklore and culture."-Daryl Cumber Dance,
Virginia Commonwealth University

U.S. Policy in Central America
The Endless Debate
Dario Moreno
"An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. Central
American policies under the Carter and Reagan administrations that exposes the roles played by competing
strategic visions and bureaucratic interest groups in shaping two of the most dramatic failures in recent U.S. foreign policy."-Andrew A. Reding, World Policy Institute
Florida International University Press

Cloth $26.95 Paper $14.95

Central America and the Middle East
The Internationalization of the Crises
Edited by DamidnJ.Ferndndez
'This valuable contribution addresses a neglected dimension of the current crisis and goes far to explain why
Central American conflict has been so hard to resolve."
-G. Pope Atkins, U.S. Naval Academy
Florida International University Press

Cloth $26.95 Paper $15.95

Florida A & M University Press

January 272 pp. 6 X 9 Cloth $29.95

eanas

The Libro de las profecias

4 4B~
a 4

of Christopher Columbus

Conchtown USA
Bahamian Fisherfolk in Riviera Beach, Florida
Photographsand Text by Charles C. Foster
Folk Songs and Tales collected by Veronica Huss
"The combination of folklore, oral history, and photographs makes this a work of interest to general readers and
scholars alike."-Stetson Kennedy
Florida Atlantic University Press

April 160 pp. 8 1/2 X 11 Paper $24.95

Amphibians and Reptiles
of the West Indies
Descriptions, Distributions, & Natural History
Albert Schwartz and Robert W. Henderson
"A definitive synopsis of West Indian herpetofauna. "
-George R. Zug, National Museum of Natural History,
Smithsonian Institution
University of Florida Press

May 740 pp. 7 X 10 Cloth $75.00

An en face editon
Translationand commentary by
Delno C. West and August Kling

*"'

"Perhaps the most important
single volume on Columbus ever
published in English... . The
uthors' classification of Columbus's
sty as 'evangelical' will be controial, but is exactly right. He was as
nopolitan in his piety as in his
-ography."-Leonard Sweet,
dent, Union Theological Seminary
University of Florida Press
May 288 pp. 8 1/2 x 11 Cloth $49.95
Through your local full-service bookseller, or direct from:
University Presses of Florida, 15 N.W. 15th St., Gainesville,
Florida 32611. 904-392-1351. Include $3.00 (UPS) or $2.00
(bookpost) shipping for the first book, $.50 for each additional
book. Florida residents add 6% sales tax to book price.
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Labor Migration Policy
by Marian Goslinga

G

overnment policy toward foreign workers-legal as well as illegal-has been much in the news lately. It is

fascinating to see how different countries deal with the issue. Cases such as the Haitians in the Dominican
Republic, the Japanese in Brazil, the Mexicans and Central Americans in the US, the Italians in Costa Rica,
and the Colombians in Venezuela have posed many of the same dilemmas to the host governments and
continue to be a focus of controversy.
The literature listed below deals with government policy, although frequently in a roundabout way.
A comprehensive bibliography does not exist, and information must be gathered from a variety of sources.

Acuerdo para reglamentar la
contrataci6n de trabajadores no
agricolas migratorios mexicanos.
EstudiosFronterizos,v. 5, no. 12-13

(January-August 1987), p. 167-74.
[About current US labor policy
towards Mexican workers.]
Alien Labor: A Bibliography. Mary
Vance. Monticello, Ill.: Vance Bibliographies, 1987. 38 p.
Amendments to the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986.
Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee
on the Judiciary House of Representatives, November 9, 1989.
Washington, DC, 1990. 351 p.
[With the IRCA and its subsequent
amendments, the US has taken a
step towards regulating the supply
of foreign labor.]
The Benefits of Immigrants to
Canada: Evidence on Tax and
Public Services. Ather H. Akbari.

Braceros haitianos en la Republica
Dominicana. FrancBaez Evertsz. 2d
ed. Instituto Dominicano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1986. 354 p.
El Canal de Panama y los trabajadores antillanos: Panama 1920,
cronologia de una lucha. Gerardo
Maloney. Panama: Ediciones Formato Diecisdis, 1989. 54 p. [This
work proves that the issue of foreign workers is not merely a postWorld War II phenomenon.]
Do outro lado do Atlantico: um
seculo de imigraqao italiana no
Brasil. Angelo Trento; Mariarosario
Fabris,Luiz Eduardode Lima
Branddo, trans. Sao Paulo, Brazil:
Nobel, 1989. [About Italian workers on Brazilian coffee plantations.]
Domestic Violence, Refugee
Flows, and International Tension:
The Case of El Salvador. Glenn P.
Hastedt, Kay M. Knickrehm.Journal of Refugee Studies, v. 1, no. 3/4

(1988), p. 260-76.

CanadianPublic Policy, v. 15

(December 1989), p. 424-35.
Big Sugar: Seasons in the Cane
Fields of Florida. Alec Wilkinson.

Knopf, 1989. 263 p. $18.95.

The Effect of Maquiladora Employment on the Monthly Flow of Mexican Undocumented Immigration to
the United States. Alberto Davila,
Rogelio Saenz. InternationalMigration Review, v. 24 (Spring 1990),

Islands.Jannette O. Domingo.
Review of Black PoliticalEconomy,
v. 18 (Summer 1989), p. 37.
Enforcing Employer Sanctions:
Challenges and Strategies. Michael
Fix, Paul T. Hill.Washington, DC:
Urban Institute, 1990.
Family Unification, Employer
Sanctions, and Anti-Discrimination
under IRCA. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of
the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, August
23, 1988. Washington, DC, 1989.

150 p.
From New York to Jamaica: Call
for Apple Pickers. Harold Faber.
New York Times, v. 136 (September
6, 1987), p. 42.
Fuerza de trabajo inmigrante japonesa y su desarrollo en el Peru: una
exploraci6n bibliografica. Amelia
Morimoto. La Molina, Peru: Taller
de Estudios Andinos, Departamento de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Nacional Agraria, 1979. 85 p.
[An older, but still relevant, work
dealing with the literature on Japanese labor in Peru.]

p. 96-107.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin
American and Caribbeanlibrarianat
FloridaInternationalUniversity.
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Employment, Income and Economic Identity in the U.S. Virgin

The Global City* New York,
London, Tokyo. Saskia Sassen.
Princeton University Press, 1991.

A Guest Worker Program for
Mexicans-and Americans. Gary
G. Jacobs. The Wall StreetJournal
(March 24, 1989).

Immigrant America: A Portrait.
Alejandro Portes, Ruben G. Rumbaut.
University of California Press,
1990.

Harvest of Confusion: Immigration
Reform and California Agriculture.
Philip L. Martin. InternationalMigration Review, v. 24 (Spring 1990),
p. 69-95. [The author claims recent
immigration reforms have not resolved the debate over agriculture's
need for alien workers in the US.]

Immigration and Illegal Aliens:
Burden or Blessing? Mark A. Siegel,
et al. Wylie, Tex.: Information Plus,
1989. 112 p. [Includes data from
US government and private
sources.]

La huelga de los titiles, 1887-1889:
un capitulo de nuestra historia social. OscarR. Aguilar Bulgarelli.San
Jose: Editorial Universidad Estatal
a Distancia, 1989. 153 p. [About
Italian railroad workers in Costa

Rica.]
Identificando trabajadores legales
mexicanos en la frontera de Estados Unidos: percepciones y
decepciones en el anilisis de la
migraci6n fronteriza. Ellwyn R.
Stoddard; Oscar Garcia Sinez,
Guadalupe Ortega, trans. Estudios
Fronterizos,v. 5, no. 12-13 (JanuaryAugust 1985), p. 95-111.
The "Illegal Alien" Policy Problem.
Jose R. Hinojosa. BorderlandsJournal, v. 10, no. 1 (Fall 1986), p. 17389.
Illegal Aliens, Employment Discrimination, and the 1986 Immigration
Reform and Control Act. Charles
E. Mitchell. Labor Law Journal v. 40
(March 1989), p. 177-82.
Illegal Aliens: Their Employment
and Employers. Barry R. Chiswick.
1988. [Based on data from Immigration and Naturalization Services
apprehension reports on illegal
aliens in Chicago.]

The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986: A Preliminary
Assessment. Wilbur A. Finch, Jr.
Social Service Review, v. 64 (June
1990), p. 244-60.
The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 Oversight.
Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, May 10 and 17, 1989.
Washington, DC, 1990, 661 p.
The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986: Employer
Liability in the Employment of Undocumented Workers. Robert K.
Robinson, Diana L. Gilbertson.
LaborLaw Journal,v. 38 (October
1987), p. 658-64.
The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift
on the Miami Labor Market. David
Card. Industrialand LaborRelations
Review, v. 43 (January 1990), p. 24557.
Impacts of the 1986 US Immigration Law on Emigration from Rural
Mexican Sending Communities.
Wayne A. Cornelius. Populationand
Development Review, v. 15 (Decem-

ber 1989), p. 689-705. [Based on
data gathered through 946 sample
survey interviews.]

The Informal Economy: Studies in
Advanced and Less Developed
Countries. Alejandro Portes,Manuel
Castells, Lauren A. Benton, eds. The
Johns Hopkins University Press,
1989. 3 6 0 p. $39.50; $16.95.
In Search of a Better Life: Perspectives on Migration from the Caribbean. Ransford W. Palmer,ed.
Praeger, 1990.
In the Privacy of Our Home:
Foreign Domestic Workers as Solution to the Crisis in the Domestic
Sphere in Canada. SedefArat-koc.
Studies in PoliticalEconomy (Spring
1989), p. 33-58.
Labor Migration in Jamaica: White
Capital and Black Labor, 18501930. Elizabeth McLean Petras.Westview Press, 1988. 297 p. [About
Jamaican workers in Panama and

Cuba.]
Labour Legislation in Canada:
A Bibliography. MarianDworaczek.
Monticello, Ill.: Vance Bibliographies, 1989. 150 p. $25.00. [Includes French citations.]
Latin American Labor Studies:
An Interim Bibliography of NonEnglish Publications. John D.
French.Center for Labor Research
and Studies, Florida International
University, 1989. 59 p. [The Center
for Labor Research and Studies
and the Latin American and
Caribbean Center at Florida International University also publish
biannually the Latin American News,
edited by John D. French, which is
available for $5.00 (individual subscription) and $15.00 (institutional

subscription).]
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Publications Update

Latin American Labor Studies: A
Bibliography of English-Language
Publications through 1989.John D.
French. Center for Labor Research
and Studies, Florida International

University, 1989. 27 p.
The Long-Term Consequences of a
Temporary Worker Program: The
U.S. Bracero Experience. Douglas
S. Massey, Zai Liang. PopulationResearch and Policy Review, v. 8 (Summer 1989), p. 199-226. [Based on
an analysis of the "tariff bracero"
program allowing Mexicans to
enter the US as guest workers,

Migration and Development in
the Caribbean. Robert Pastor,ed.
Westview Press, 1988.
The Mobility of Labor and Capital:
International Investment and
Labor Flows. Saskia Sassen. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
La moderna esclavitud: los indocumentados en Venezuela.
Alcides Gomez J., Luz MarinaDiaz M.
Bogota: Editorial La Oveja Negra,
1983. 3 4 8 p. [About Colombian
labor in Venezuela.]

1942-64.]
Maquiladoras: A Bibliography.
PriscillaJ.Files. Monticello, Ill.:
Vance Bibliographies, 1990. 8 p.
The Maya of Florida. Allan Burns.
Migration World, v. 17, no. 3/4,
p. 20-26. [Economic and social
data about the Kanjobal Maya who
have emigrated from Guatemala to
Indiantown, Florida.]
Mexican Immigrant Workers in
the Southwest: The 1920's and the
1980's. Elaine C. Lacy. Review of
Latin American Studies, v. 1, no. 2

(1988), p. 103-20.

New Guidelines on Discretionary
Powers. Refuge, v. 9 (May 1990),
p. 15-17. [Issued by the Employment and Immigration Ministry of
Canada on the subject of reviewing
refugee claims.]
Opening and Closing the Doors:
Evaluating Immigration Reform
and Control. FrankD. Bean, Georges
Vernez, Charles B. Keely. University
Press of America, 1989. 138 p.
$23.75. [Emphasis on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act.]

Mexican Labor and World War II:
Braceros in the Pacific Noithwest,
1942-1947. Erasmo Gamboa. University of Texas Press, 1990. 178 p.

Out of the Spotlight and into the
Shadows.Jennifer L. Gordon.
Migration World, v. 17, no. 5 (1989),
p. 10-17. [About the impact of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act on employers and on the

Las migraciones laborales en Paraguay: diagn6stico demografico.
Organization of American States,
1986. 62 p.

Sending $7 Billion Home to
Madre. Patrice Duggan,Joel Millman. Forbes, v. 145 (March 19,

undocumented.]

1990), p. 139.
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Las migraciones laborales colombovenezolanas. GabrielBidegain
Greising,ed. Caracas: Instituto
Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1987. 175 p.

Should Foreign Workers Be
Welcomed? Mitsunobu Sugiyama.
Japan Quarterly,v. 35 (July-Septem-

Migrant Workers and the Transformation of Western Societies.
Stephen Castles. Center for International Studies, Cornell University,
1989. 119 p.

Situacion del mercado laboral en
Jap6n en los uiltimos anios. Lourdes
Franco Cobos. Economia y Desarrollo,
no. 103 (March-April 1988), p. 16064.

ber 1988), p. 260-65.

Sugar and Modern Slavery: A Tale
of Two Countries. Roger Plant.Zed
Books, 1987. 177 p. $37.50; $11.50.
[About Haitian workers in the
Dominican Republic.]
A Time Bomb Ticking: Canadian
Immigration in Crisis. Toronto,
Ont.: Mackenzie Institute for the
Study of Terrorism, Revolution and
Propaganda, 1989. 39 p. $4.50. [A
critique of current policy.]
U.S. Agriculture and Foreign
Workers: An Annotated Bibliography. Robert D. Emerson, Anita L.
Battiste. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1988.
Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response.
Report of the Commission for the
Study of International Migration
and Cooperative Economic Development, 1990. 149 p. [In its
Working Papers, the Commission
presents the research of distinguished US and foreign investigators dealing with migration,
labor, and other related subjects.
For a complete list of titles in this
series, contact the Commission at
1111 18th Street, NW, Suite 800,
Washington, DC 20036. Telephone
(202) 254-4954; FAX (202) 254-

4965.]

Undocumented Immigration in the
United States: Some Thoughts
about Research Challenges, Impacts and Recent Policy Initiatives.
Demetrios G. Papademetriou. Studi
Emigrazione (Rome), v. 29 (September-December 1988), p. 591-617.
Undocumented Workers and
Regional Differences in Apparel
Labor Markets. Carolyn SherwoodCall. FederalReserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, Winter 1989,
p. 53-63.
When Borders Don't Divide: Labor
Migration and Refugee Movements
in the Americas. PatriciaPessar,ed.
New York: Center for Migration

Studies, 1988.
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